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SUMMARY
Operations strategies, whether prompted by competitive or regulatory forces,
can greatly impact firm performance. While operations strategies cover a wide spec-
trum of issues – supply chain management, technology choice, capacity allocation,
etc. – this dissertation focuses on two such issues, namely, sustainability and prod-
uct development. The thesis comprises three essays. The first essay (Chapter 2)
examines a regulatory aspect of sustainability strategy, product take-back, a form
of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR). With a stylized model, we analyze the
trade-offs between assigning full responsibility for product recovery to a single echelon
in a multi-echelon supply chain versus sharing responsibility between echelons. We
demonstrate how the sharing of EPR program costs between the echelons can move
the supply chain closer to the coordinated profit benchmark. The second essay (Chap-
ter 3) examines a voluntary aspect of sustainability from an empirical perspective.
We investigate the impact from various types of corporate environmental initiatives
and environmental awards and certifications on the market value of the firm. We find
that the market is selective in reacting to environmental performance, with certain
types of initiatives and awards even valued negatively. The third essay (Chapter 4) is
an empirical examination of the shareholder value effects that result from the restruc-
turing of firms’ product development activities. We find that, on average, the stock
market reacts positively to product development restructuring, and that the reaction





Given that Operations Management encompasses the design, operation, and improve-
ment of the systems that create and deliver the firm’s primary products and services,
effective operations strategies are critical to any business. Well-designed operations
strategies enhance the firm’s abilities to compete effectively in the ever-changing eco-
nomic environment. Operations strategies cover a wide spectrum of issues: supply
chain management, technology choice, capacity allocation, etc. This dissertation
focuses on two such issues that are of increasing importance and interest, namely,
sustainability and product development. Emphasis on sustainability continues to ex-
pand for several compelling reasons: escalating energy and material costs, increasing
public pressure for improved environmental, health, and safety performance, shift-
ing consumer preference for “green” products, and sharpening stakeholder focus on
sustainability performance. Similarly, the escalating pace of technological change
and product churn, as well as increasing competition, has elevated the criticality of
product development to the market success and financial health of the firm. The
dissertation comprises three essays: the first two examine specified regulatory and
voluntary aspects of firms’ sustainability strategies, and the third is a study of the
strategies involved in product development restructuring. The first essay uses an an-
alytical modeling approach to determine the sustainability strategy that maximizes
firm and supply chain profit. The second and third essays empirically estimate the
impact of sustainability and product development strategies, respectively, on financial
performance.
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The first essay, presented in Chapter 2, analyzes product take-back, a form of Ex-
tended Producer Responsibility (EPR). EPR aims to shift responsibility for end-of-life
products from society to the beneficiaries of products and, thus, to incent producers
to provide more environmentally-friendly designs. EPR programs typically hold the
producer – a single actor defined by the regulator – responsible for the environmental
impacts of end-of-life products. This is despite emphasis on the need to involve all ac-
tors in the supply chain in order to best achieve the aims of EPR. In this chapter, we
explore the important economic and environmental implications of sharing EPR pro-
gram costs. We develop and present a steady-state, two-echelon supply chain model
to examine the impacts of product collection and recycling mandates on the incentive
to recycle, and resulting profits in the integrated and decentralized supply chains.
For the decentralized supply chain, we demonstrate how the sharing of EPR program
costs between the echelons can move the supply chain closer to the coordinated profit
benchmark and suggest a contract menu that can Pareto-improve profits. To exam-
ine both the economic and environmental performance associated with the sharing
of program costs, and assess the overall effectiveness of EPR programs, we propose
a social welfare construct that considers supply chain profit, consumer surplus, and
the environmental externalities associated with virgin material extraction, product
consumption, and disposal of non-recycled products. Using a numerical example, we
discuss how EPR program cost sharing may or may not improve social welfare. The
results of this research are of value to firms either anticipating or subject to product
recovery legislation, and to social planners that attempt to balance economic and
environmental outcomes and ensure the fairness of such legislation.
The second essay, presented in Chapter 3, empirically investigates the impact
from various types of corporate environmental initiatives and environmental awards
and certifications on the market value of the firm. This research analyzes the share-
holder value effects of environmental performance by measuring the stock market
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reaction associated with announcements of environmental performance. We examine
the market reaction to two categories of environmental performance. The first cate-
gory includes 430 announcements of Corporate Environmental Initiatives (CEIs) that
provide information about self-reported corporate efforts designed to avoid, mitigate,
or offset the environmental impact of the firm’s goods, services, or processes. Such
initiatives include environmental business strategies, environmental philanthropy, vol-
untary emission reductions, eco-friendly products, renewable energy, recycling, and
miscellaneous. The second category includes 381 announcements of Environmental
Awards and Certifications (EACs) that provide information about recognition granted
by third parties specifically for environmental performance. Awards include those
granted by federal governments, state or local governments, and non-governmental
agencies. Certifications include ISO14001 and LEED. Although the market does not
react significantly to the aggregated CEI and EAC announcements, we do find statisti-
cally significant market reactions for certain CEI and EAC subcategories. Specifically,
announcements of philanthropic gifts to environmental causes are associated with sig-
nificant positive market reaction, voluntary emission reductions are associated with
significant negative market reaction, and ISO 14001 certifications are associated with
significant positive market reaction. Thus, we find that the market is highly selective
in reacting to environmental efforts; when the market does react, it does not do so
uniformly as the market reactions to certain environmental efforts are even negative.
The final essay, presented in Chapter 4, empirically examines the shareholder value
effects of restructuring product development. Given its potential impact on compet-
itive advantage, product development is the subject of many product and platform
level strategies to improve its effectiveness. One firm level improvement strategy is
product development restructuring (PDR), which includes reorganizing, realigning,
refocusing, and streamlining the product development function. This chapter ana-
lyzes the shareholder value effects of PDR by measuring the stock market reaction
3
associated with announcements of PDR. We estimate the average abnormal return
for a sample of 114 firms around the date when information about PDR is announced.
On average, announcements of PDR result in a statistically significant 1.60% increase
in stock value. To understand how market reaction to PDR is influenced by charac-
teristics of the firm and the restructuring, we develop and test hypotheses that relate
the stock market reaction to the announcing firm’s prior financial performance, pri-
mary restructuring objective, R&D expenditures, and size. We find that the market
reaction to PDR is more positive for announcing firms that financially underperform
than for those that financially outperform their industry group. We also find that
the market reaction to PDR is not significantly affected by whether the firm’s pri-
mary PDR objective is to cut costs or to increase revenues. However, the interaction
between the firm’s prior financial performance and its primary PDR objective is sig-
nificant. For firms that are financial underperformers (outperformers), the market
reaction to PDR is more positive if the firm’s primary objective is to cut costs (in-
crease revenues). We also find that the market reaction to PDR is more positive for
announcing firms with higher R&D intensity. Last, we find that the market reaction
to PDR by small firms is more positive than it is to PDR by large firms. Thus, PDR,
on average, creates statistically and economically significant shareholder value.
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CHAPTER II
SHARING RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRODUCT
RECOVERY ACROSS THE SUPPLY CHAIN
2.1 Introduction and Literature Review
As residential and industrial waste continues to grow, alternatives are being sought to
deal with end-of-life products. Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) has emerged
as one such alternative. The OECD defines EPR as “. . . an environmental policy
approach in which a producer’s responsibility for a product is extended to the post-
consumer stage of a product’s life cycle” (OECD 2001). EPR aims to shift financial
or physical responsibility for end-of-life products from society to beneficiaries of the
products, thus incentivizing producers to provide environmentally-friendly products
with efficient use of materials and lower hazardous material content.
The means to accomplish these goals within the framework of EPR are varied
and include deposit/refund schemes, advance disposal fees, raw material taxes, pro-
ducer taxes to subsidize waste treatment, minimum recycled content standards, leas-
ing/servicizing, and product take-back. Each of these instruments has advantages
and limitations (OECD 2001). Examples of mandated EPR programs include recov-
ery1 of packaging materials (e.g., Bell 1998, Fishbein 1998, Tojo et al. 2003), and
take-back of electronic goods (e.g., Tojo 2001, Appelbaum 2002, Walls 2006), among
others. Examples of voluntary efforts are discussed in Davis et al. (1997) and Fish-
bein (2000). In some cases, voluntary programs are indeed economically advantageous
(Toffel 2004, Heese et al. 2005).
The focus of this paper is on the product recovery element of EPR and its impact
1We use the term product recovery to generally refer to collection and recycling activities.
5
on the economic and environmental performance of the supply chain. Product recov-
ery encompasses the collection of end-of-life products and their appropriate treatment,
be it reconditioning, remanufacturing, recycling, or disposal. Recovery programs typ-
ically include targets – both for collection as well as for salvage of used products. A
commonly cited example is the European Union’s (EU) Waste Electrical and Elec-
tronics Equipment (WEEE) Directive, enacted in 2003. Legislative transpositions of
the directive specify targets both for product collection and recycling. In general,
responsibility for product recovery can be either financial or physical (infrastruc-
tural). Financial responsibilities are often mandated through instruments such as
cost-sharing formulas, advance disposal fees, or end-user fees while the physical or-
ganization of product recovery is typically left to the discretion of the producer(s)
provided the mandated targets are met (Tojo et al. 2003).
A key question in the EPR context is the definition of producer and the corre-
sponding allocation of responsibility. With many different actors in the supply chain
from raw material suppliers to retailers, who should be identified as the “producer”
and be held responsible for end-of-life products? Researchers have highlighted the
need to extend responsibility across the supply chain so that every party involved
has an incentive to minimize the environmental impacts of products (Davis et al.
1997). However, the determination of the responsible firm(s) can be complex and
contentious (Fishbein 2000). Despite the OECD’s statement that “. . . allocating re-
sponsibility and determining who is the producer are two of the most important [EPR]
policy design issues . . . ” (OECD 2001), most EPR programs identify a single actor
within the supply chain as the responsible party. For example, within the packaging
supply chain are the paper and plastics manufacturers, the converters who turn paper
and plastic into containers, the firms that pack or fill the containers, and the distribu-
tion chain consisting of distributors, wholesalers, retailers, and consumers. Which of
these parties should be responsible? In most EU member states, consensus has been
6
that the packers and fillers should be the responsible “producers” (Fishbein 1998).
Similarly, the WEEE directive names a single actor, the “importer of record,” as the
producer. An exception is the packaging recovery program in the UK. The program
allocates costs between supply chain echelons, with the largest portion (48%) assigned
to the retailers (UK-DEFRA 2003, Walls 2006). There has been considerable debate
as to whether this particular allocation is fair or whether the administrative burden of
involving multiple parties is worthwhile (Bell 1998, Scarlett 1999, Bailey 2000). But
are any of these responsibility allocations optimal for providing incentives to each of
the firms within the chain to operate in an environmentally responsible manner? In
comparison to the published literature regarding the motivation, history, and work-
ings of EPR, research analyzing the impact of EPR on interactions within a supply
chain is less prevalent. We therefore address the following research questions in this
paper
1. What are the impacts of collection and recycling targets under an EPR program,
on the incentive to recycle and resulting quantities and profits in the supply
chain? How do the above impacts depend upon supply chain structure (i.e.,
whether integrated or decentralized)?
2. What are the profitability implications of sharing responsibility for product re-
covery across the supply chain? How might the level of sharing be set?
3. What effect does sharing responsibility have on the more holistic measure of so-
cial welfare that considers virgin material extraction, consumption, and disposal
externalities together with supply chain profit and consumer surplus?
To address the above research questions, we develop and analyze steady-state
models of both an integrated and a decentralized two-echelon supply chain. For
the decentralized supply chain we examine the two cases where product recovery
responsibility rests solely with the downstream echelon and where responsibility is
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shared between the two echelons. The context for our model is a supplier who provides
raw material to a manufacturer; the manufacturer’s product is recyclable and the
recycled material can be substituted for virgin raw material (e.g., a raw steel producer
supplying to a fabricator).
We find that the collection and recycling targets impact recycling incentives and,
hence, supply chain quantities and profits in interesting ways. The targets always
negatively impact supply chain profits. Whereas the targets reduce the amount of
virgin material consumed in the integrated supply chain, they may in fact increase the
amount of virgin material consumed in the decentralized supply chain under certain
conditions, analogous to the “Jevons effect” (Hentwich 2005). For the decentralized
supply chain, we demonstrate how the sharing of EPR program costs between the
echelons can move the supply chain closer to the coordinated profit benchmark, and
suggest a contract menu that can Pareto-improve supply chain profits. However,
the sharing of program costs increases the amount of virgin material used as well
as the total quantity produced. Therefore, to holistically assess the societal impacts
of EPR regulation and program cost sharing, we propose a social welfare construct
that explicitly considers the externalities associated with virgin material extraction,
product consumption, and disposal, in addition to supply chain profits and consumer
surplus. Using a numerical example, we discuss how program cost sharing may or
may not improve social welfare.
Our work attempts to bridge two streams of literature – the operations man-
agement literature that treats the interface between operational decisions and the
environment, and the pertinent literature on environmental economics and indus-
trial ecology that aims to characterize the societal or indirect impacts of economic
activity. The operations management literature contains a substantial and growing
number of articles pertaining to closed-loop supply chains with product remanufac-
turing (see surveys by Corbett & Kleindorfer 2001, Kleindorfer et al. 2005, Guide
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& Van Wassenhove 2006, Souza 2008, and Atasu et al. 2008). The extant literature
mainly treats strategic, tactical, and operational issues related to product collection
and remanufacturing, and the influence of economic and competitive drivers on prod-
uct recovery decisions. Of particular relevance are recent papers that explore the
interface of product recovery regulation and supply chain management. Plambeck
and Taylor (2007) examine the effectiveness of manufacturers’ testing of competitors’
products as a strategy to improve compliance with Restriction of Hazardous Sub-
stances (RoHS)-type regulation. Subramanian et al. (2009) demonstrate that supply
chain coordination can result in superior environmental design of a remanufacturable
product subject to EPR regulation. Plambeck and Wang (2009) explore the impact
of e-waste regulation (WEEE) on the timing of new product introductions. Atasu et
al. (2009) model an economic system comprising the regulator, manufacturer, and
consumer, to investigate the competitive impacts of and possible improvements to
weight-based product recovery targets. Consistent with the spirit of these papers,
our focus is not per se to critique the variety of EPR instruments but rather to
explore their impacts that are of managerial relevance, including the important im-
plications of sharing responsibility for product recovery across supply chain echelons.
In addition, we propose a social welfare construct that considers both economic and
environmental performance and highlights the associated trade-offs.
To assess the environmental impacts of product recovery targets and the sharing of
recovery responsibility, we draw upon the related environmental economics literature
that attempts to characterize environmental externalities and measure their societal
impacts (see survey by Cropper & Oates 1992). The externalities considered in our
analysis include those associated with the extraction of virgin material, consumption
of the product, and the disposal of both collected and uncollected product. Exter-
nalities associated with virgin material extraction include land use, untreated runoff,
reclamation, and resource depletion (Söderholm 2006). The social costs of product
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disposal include land aesthetics, leakage, and future remediation costs (Huhtula 1997,
Runkel 2003). Product consumption is associated with the societal costs of energy
use, material flows, and intensity of land usage (Spangenberg 2004). The classic reme-
dies for mitigating environmental externalities include taxes and subsidies. However,
and more recently, the need for upstream and goal-oriented policy interventions such
as EPR has been emphasized in the environmental economics literature (Fullerton &
Wu 1998, Calcott & Walls 2000, Walls 2006). We also note the pertinent work in
the area of industrial ecology, specifically life-cycle assessments (LCAs), which pro-
vide measures of indirect costs associated with economic activity (Matthews & Lifset
2007).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the model. Section 2.3
analyzes the impacts of collection and recycling targets on the optimal profit and
quantities in the integrated supply chain while Section 2.4 examines the effects of
these targets in the decentralized supply chain. Section 2.5 discusses the implications
of sharing program costs and introduces a contract menu that can Pareto-improve
profits in the supply chain. Section 2.6 discusses the results in light of our social
welfare construct, and includes a numerical example that motivates how program
cost sharing affects social welfare. Section 2.7 concludes the paper with a summary
of our main results and key managerial insights.
2.2 Model
The context for our model is a supplier S (referred to as she) supplying raw mater-
ial to a manufacturer M (referred to as he). The manufacturer transforms the raw
material into product demanded by customers; we generally refer to the transforma-
tion activities as production. Each firm’s objective is to maximize profit. We focus
our attention on firm-level interactions under EPR with mandates on both product
collection and recycling. Some EPR instruments, including advance disposal fees and
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deposit/refund systems, require that consumers share the costs of managing end-of-
life products. This could possibly be modeled in addition, but our focus is on the
production side of the supply chain.
In classic EPR programs, a single actor in the supply chain is typically held
responsible for the collection, recycling, or disposal of end-of-life products. As is the
case with most EPR programs, our model treats the manufacturer as the producer
who is held responsible for product recovery costs. We assume that product returns
are recyclable; however, the yield in recycling could be less than 100% (although we
model a 100% yield without loss of generality). Recycling only occurs at the supplier
and only if it is economically attractive to her. Under regulation, the manufacturer,
who is responsible for ensuring that the mandated targets are met, must sufficiently
incentivize the supplier to recycle at or above the mandated level. As is true in
several process industry settings (e.g., metals and plastics), we assume that recycled
raw material and virgin raw material are identical to the manufacturer. Also, we
assume the supply of virgin material to be unconstrained for the purposes of our
problem. We focus on a representative steady state period in which virgin material
is processed by the supplier and transformed into product by the manufacturer, and
products sold to customers in a prior period are collected, recycled, and possibly
disposed of.
Governments may elect to establish product recovery programs with either a tar-
get collection rate, target recycling rate, or both (Tojo et al. 2003). Examples include
the EU’s End-of-Life Vehicle (ELV) directive with recycling targets only and trans-
positions of the WEEE directive with both collection and recycling targets. Policy
choices are often a function of the industry’s infrastructure, e.g., industries without
established collection or recycling activities may first be given only a collection target
while industries that currently collect and recycle may be given a recycling target
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instead.2 Collection mandates alone (without recycling targets) may be implemented
if the product is hazardous, if proper disposal is required, if there is no market for the
recycled product, or if recycling possibilities are limited. Commonly cited examples
include batteries and automotive tires. Recycling mandates alone (without collection
targets) could be the case in industries with some level of collection and recycling
history where the regulatory program’s objective is to boost the already-established
recycling efforts. Examples include automobiles and packaging materials. Establish-
ing both collection and recycling targets could be a recognition that not all of the
collected product is recyclable due to the quality of returns or particular market con-
ditions, but a high collection target is desired in order to ensure adequate recovery
and appropriate disposal of products. Waste electronics is an example. To permit
study of the above possibilities, our model includes two principal product recovery
program parameters τ and ρ, which are the mandated minimum (or target) rates for
product collection and recycling, respectively, and are modeled as fractions of the
total production quantity. Logically, we have τ > ρ. In addition, we assume that reg-
ulation constrains “business-as-usual”, implying that ρ is greater than the supplier’s
optimal recycling rate in the absence of regulation.
We denote each quantity with two subscripts, i.e., qki. Subscript k identifies the
quantity type, i.e., whether Virgin, Collected, Recycled, Disposed, or Total. Subscript
i identifies the scenario of either No regulation or Regulation. For example, the
quantity of virgin material processed by the supplier under regulation is qV R. The
quantities recycled by the supplier in the absence and presence of regulation are
denoted as qRN and qRR, respectively. Any material collected but not recycled must
be disposed of; the disposed quantity is denoted as qDi. The total quantity produced
by the manufacturer is denoted as qTi, which is the sum of production quantities
using virgin and recycled material (i.e., qTi = qV i + qRi). We assume a linear inverse
2In some cases, the recycling target may be specified as a percentage of the collected amount.
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demand function p = a− bqTi where p is the unit price paid by the end customer.
To create a baseline for comparisons, we begin by analyzing the integrated supply
chain. The integrated supply chain is equivalent to a vertically integrated manufac-
turer who bears full responsibility for EPR-related costs. As the next step, we analyze
the decentralized supply chain to study the interactions associated with the existence
and sharing of EPR-related costs. In the decentralized supply chain, the supplier
charges wholesale price wi > 0 to the manufacturer per unit of material supplied.
Under regulation, the manufacturer may have to collect product to ensure that the
mandate is met; the manufacturer offers this collected product to the supplier at a
unit transfer price of η (possibly < 0). Since material may be collected by either the
integrated firm, or the supplier/manufacturer in the decentralized supply chain, we
add the superscript j ∈ {Integrated Supply Chain, Supplier, Manufacturer} to the
collected quantities, i.e., qjCi. For example, the quantity collected by the manufac-
turer for the purpose of meeting collection and recycling mandates in the decentralized
supply chain is denoted as qMCR. Profits are denoted as Π
j
i .
Collection and recycling costs are functions of the total collected and recycled
quantities, respectively, i.e., we have Cj(q
j
Ci) and R(qRi), where i ∈ {N, R}, and
j ∈ {I, M, S}. Given the increasing marginal effort in collecting end-of-life products,
we assume C ′j > 0 and C
′′
j > 0 (e.g., Ferguson & Toktay 2006). Recycling, on the
other hand, typically exhibits economies of scale; we therefore assume R′ > 0 and
R′′ < 0 (e.g., Callan & Thomas 2001, Toyasaki et al. 2008). We assume a constant
marginal cost of disposal D, consistent with the common per-unit-weight or volume
assessments of disposal costs. Since we analyze the supply chain in steady state,
we assume that the marginal costs of collection, recycling, disposal, virgin material
processing (V ) for the supplier, and production (M) for the manufacturer, are time-
invariant. Also, without loss of generality, we assume fixed costs to be zero; profit-
maximizing firms will not collect or recycle if profit does not at least cover fixed costs.
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Table 2.1 summarizes the notation used in the model.
Table 2.1: Model Notation
Symbol Definition
Quantities qV i Virgin material quantity; i ∈ {No regulation, Regulation}
qjCi Collected quantity; j ∈ {Integrated Supply Chain, Manufacturer, Supplier}
qRi Recycled quantity
qDi Disposed quantity; qDi = q
j
Ci − qRi
qTi Total quantity produced; qTi = qV i + qRi
Cost Functions Cj(q
j






R(qRi) Recycling cost as a function of recycled quantity; R(qRi) := r0qRi − r1 [qRi]2
Marginal Costs D Disposal cost
V Supplier’s cost of acquiring and processing virgin material
M Manufacturer’s cost of production using either virgin or recycled material
Ek Environmental externality; k ∈ {consumption, disposal, virgin material extraction}
Fractions τ Mandated collection rate; τ ≤ 1
ρ Mandated recycling rate; 0 < ρ < τ
γi Recycling rate (decision)
ψ Portion of program cost shared by supplier; ψ ∈ (0, 1)
Prices η Transfer price charged by manufacturer for his collected material (possibly < 0)
wi Wholesale price charged by supplier
p End product price charged by manufacturer; p = a− bqTi
Objectives Πji Profit; j ∈ {Integrated Supply Chain, Manufacturer, Supplier, Total Supply Chain}
SW Social Welfare
2.3 Integrated Supply Chain
We first consider the integrated supply chain to establish a baseline for comparisons.
The integrated supply chain is equivalent to a vertically integrated manufacturer with
full responsibility for product recovery. Several examples of vertical integration still
exist. Steel mills with their own rolling or fabrication shops, consumer products com-
panies with internal paper mills or plastics shops, and machining facilities with their
own foundries are all examples of vertically integrated firms with internal suppliers
providing both virgin material and recycled material.
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2.3.1 Integrated Supply Chain: Recycling under No Regulation
Even in the absence of regulation, recycling may be conducted if it is economically
viable. This has historically been the case with materials such as automotive scrap
metal and industrial scrap copper. Under no regulation (i.e., i = N), we denote the
recycling rate chosen by the integrated firm as γN and refer to it as the “business-as-
usual” recycling rate. Using qRN = γNqTN , qV N = (1− γN)qTN , and qICN = qRN since
the firm will only collect as much product as it chooses to recycle (i.e., qDN = 0), the
profit of the integrated supply chain in any steady-state period is:
ΠIN = [p−M ][qV N + qRN ]− V qV N − CI(qICN)−R(qRN)
= [a−M − (1− γN)V ]qTN − bq2TN − CI(γNqTN)−R(γNqTN)
For convenience, we define the program cost under no regulation as P IN(qTN , γN) :=
CI(γNqTN) + R(γNqTN).




ΠIN = [a−M − (1− γN)V ]qTN − bq2TN − P IN(qTN , γN) (2.1)
Proposition 2.1 Π := [a −M − (1 − γ)V ]q − bq2 − P (q, γ) is jointly concave in q
and γ when P (q, γ) is sufficiently convex increasing in q and γ.
Proof: The first and second order derivatives of Π with respect to q and γ are:
∂Π
∂q
= a−M − (1− γ)V − 2bq − Pq ∂
2Π
∂q2
= −2b− Pqq < 0, since Pqq > 0
∂Π
∂γ
= qV − Pγ ∂
2Π
∂γ2
= −Pγγ < 0, since Pγγ > 0
The determinant of the Hessian matrix of Π with respect to q and γ is:
DH :=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−2b− Pqq V − Pqγ
V − Pqγ −Pγγ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= (2b + Pqq)Pγγ − (V − Pqγ)2
3Similarly, in Section 2.3.2, we define P IR(qTR, γR) as the program cost for the integrated supply
chain under regulation.
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DH > 0 when Pqq and Pγγ are sufficiently large. 2
For the remainder of the paper, we assume that program costs are sufficiently
convex increasing in the total quantity (qTi) and the recycling rate (γi), so that
steady-state profits per period for the firm in the integrated supply chain and for the
manufacturer in the decentralized supply chain (Section 2.4.2), are jointly concave in
the total quantity and the recycling rate.
Assumption 2.1 Program costs are sufficiently convex increasing in the total quan-
tity and recycling rate.
So as to provide further structure to our problem, we specify functional forms for
the total costs of collection and recycling. We specify collection and recycling costs
as:
Cj(z) = cjz
2; R(z) = r0z − r1z2
where cj > 0, j ∈ {I, M, S}; and r0 > 0, r1 > 0 are such that R′ > 0 and R′′ <
0. In other words, collection costs are convex increasing in the quantity collected
(diseconomies of scale) whereas recycling costs are concave increasing in the quantity
recycled (economies of scale). The conditions on cj, r0, and r1 for ensuring joint
concavity of profit (in qT i and γi as mentioned above) turn out to be straightforward.
For example, it can be shown that for the integrated supply chain under no regulation,
cI > r1 ensures the joint concavity of Π
I
N in qTN and γN . We assume cj > r1 (i.e., that
the cost of collection is sufficiently large) for the remainder of the paper. Proposition
2.2 presents the optimal recycling rate and total quantity for the integrated supply
chain under no regulation.
Assumption 2.2 Total collection and recycling costs are of the form Cj(z) = cjz
2
and R(z) = r0z − r1z2, where cj > r1, and r0 > 0, r1 > 0 are such that R′ > 0 and
R′′ < 0.4
4Logically, we have cI ≤ min{cM , cS}.
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Proposition 2.2 The optimal recycling rate for the integrated supply chain under no
regulation is γIN := max
{
(V−r0)b
(a−M−V )(cI−r1) , 0
}
.
Proof: Under Assumption 2.2, it can be shown that ΠIN in (2.1) is jointly concave in
qTN and γN . Equating the first order derivatives of Π
I
N with respect to qTN and γN











In order to avoid trivial situations, we require that the mandated minimum re-
cycling rate (ρ) be such that it exceeds the rate at which the firm would recycle in
absence of regulation (i.e., γIN). Put differently, the term V − r0 captures the dif-
ference between virgin material and recycling costs. The greater this difference, the
more economically attractive recycling is to the firm. From (2.2), we can see that
if V − r0 is sufficiently great, γIN would approach 1 and regulation would become
irrelevant. Therefore, we restrict our attention to the case where V − r0 is bounded
such that regulation affects business-as-usual.5
Assumption 2.3 We assume V − r0 < ρ(a−M−V )(cI−r1)b so that regulation constrains
business-as-usual for the integrated supply chain.
Corollary 2.1 The optimal virgin material quantity, recycled quantity, and profit for
5Assumption 2.4 in Section 2.4.1 specifies a similar bound on V − r0 for the decentralized supply
chain.
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2.3.2 Integrated Supply Chain: Recycling under Regulation
Under regulation, we denote the recycling rate chosen by the integrated firm as γR.
Recall that ρ and τ represent the mandated minimum recycling and collection rates,
respectively (ρ < τ). With Assumption 2.3 above, it can be shown that it is never
optimal for γR to exceed τ . Using qRR = γRqTR, qV R = (1 − γR)qTR, and qICR =
τqTR = qRR + qDR so that qDR = (τ − γR)qTR, the profit for the integrated supply
chain in any steady-state period is:7
ΠIR = [p−M ][qV R + qRR]− V qV R − CI(qICR)−R(qRR)−DqDR
= [a−M − (1− γR)V ]qTR − bq2TR − C(τqTR)−R(γRqTR)−D[τ − γR]qTR




ΠIR = [a−M − (1− γR)V ]qTR − bq2TR − PR(qTR, γR) (2.3)
where PR(qTR, γR) = cIτ
2q2TR + r0γRqTR − r1γ2Rq2TR + D[τ − γR]qTR is the program
cost under regulation. Proposition 2.3 presents the optimal choice of γR.








TR(τ), τ) ≥ ΠIR(qITR(ρ), ρ)
ρ otherwise.
6Note: [V − r0]+ = max{V − r0, 0}.








; and b1(·) := b +
cMτ
2 − r1(·)2.
Proof: Expanding (2.3) and taking the first and second order derivatives with respect
to γR, we have:
∂ΠIR
∂γR





TR > 0 (2.4)
Thus, ΠIR is convex in γR ∈ [ρ, τ ], implying that the integrated firm’s profit under
regulation will be maximized at one of the extreme values, namely, ρ or τ . It can be






implied by Assumption 2.2 and the fact that it is not optimal for the firm to choose
γR > τ . Taking the first order derivative of Π
I
R with respect to qTR and equating to
0, we obtain:
qITR(γR) :=




Table 2.2 summarizes the optimal quantities and profits for the integrated supply
chain both under no regulation (Section 2.3.1) and under regulation (Section 2.3.2).
We observe that ΠIN > Π
I
R, i.e., regulation decreases the profit of the integrated firm.
Corollaries 2.2 and 2.3 contrast the total and virgin material quantities in the presence
and absence of regulation.




V R < q
I
V N .










; i.e., if V − r0 < τa1(cI − r1)
b
which follows from Assumption 2.3 and that τ > ρ. Also, since qIV R = (1 − γIR)qITR
and qIV N = (1− γIN)qITN where γIR > γIN , we have qIV R < qIV N . The proof is similar for
γIR = ρ. 2
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Table 2.2: Results for the Integrated Supply Chain
Note: a1 := a−M − V ; a2(·) := a1 + (·)[V − r0]− [τ − (·)]D; b1(·) := b + cIτ2 − r1(·)2
No Regulation (i = N) Regulation (i = R)

































































Corollary 2.3 For the integrated supply chain under regulation, if V − r0 > −D −
2r1ρa2(ρ)
b1(ρ)
, [i.] qITR(τ) > q
I
TR(ρ), and [ii.] ∃ ¯τI , τ I such that q
I





τI , τ I ].




(V − r0 + D)b1(γR) + 2r1γR[a2(γR)]
2[b1(γR)]2
> 0, if V − r0 > −D − 2r1γRa2(γR)
b1(γR)
.
The first part of Corollary 2.3 follows from the fact that ρ < τ , a2(ρ) < a2(τ), and
b1(ρ) > b1(τ). The second part follows from the fact that q
I
V R(τ) = (1 − τ)qITR(τ),
qIV R(ρ) = (1− ρ)qITR(ρ), ρ < τ , and that the quantities (as functions of the recycling
rates) are well behaved. 2
Note that the extensive environmental economics literature discusses alternatives
that drive ΠIR(q
I




TR(ρ), ρ) and, hence, γ
I
R = τ (also see (2.4)). Eco-
nomic interventions such as higher virgin material taxes (i.e., increasing V ), tipping
fees (i.e., increasing D), and recycling subsidies (i.e., decreasing r0, increasing r1),
are examples. Corollary 2.3 shows that such interventions could result in greater
overall consumption as well as increased virgin material use. However, note that if τ
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is large enough, it is possible that qIV R(τ) can be less than q
I
V R(ρ) despite that fact
that qITR(τ) > q
I
TR(ρ).
2.4 Decentralized Supply Chain
We model the decentralized supply chain as a bilateral monopoly where the supplier
(she) and manufacturer (he) are separate firms and each has a private objective to op-
timize. In each steady-state period under no regulation, the manufacturer purchases
material from the supplier at a unit wholesale price wN and incurs a unit manufac-
turing cost M ; he sells each unit of end product at price p. Also, the manufacturer
determines the total quantity qTN that maximizes his profit while the supplier deter-
mines the (business-as-usual) recycling rate γN . Under regulation, the manufacturer
decides the total quantity qTR but must ensure both that the mandated quantity τqTR
is collected and that the supplier recycles at least the mandated quantity ρqTR. Since
he is responsible for ensuring that the collection and recycling mandates are met and
since, by assumption, regulation constrains business-as-usual, the manufacturer too
undertakes collection under regulation. The manufacturer charges a transfer price η
(possibly < 0) to the supplier for his collected material, such that his profit is maxi-
mized subject to regulatory compliance. The supplier determines the wholesale price
wR to maximize her profit. We maintain Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 for our analysis of
the decentralized supply chain.
2.4.1 Decentralized Supply Chain: Recycling under No Regulation
Under no regulation, the manufacturer is not responsible for any collection or recy-
cling costs. The three decision variables in this scenario are the total quantity qTN
(determined by the manufacturer), and wholesale price wN and recycling rate γN
(determined by the supplier). The setting implies a dynamic game of complete infor-
mation and can be solved using backward induction (e.g., Tsay et al. 1999, Cachon
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2002). The objectives for the manufacturer and supplier are:
max
qTN≥0
ΠMN = [p− wN −M ]qTN (2.6)
max
wN≥0, γN≥0





Proposition 2.4 The optimal recycling rate for the supplier in the decentralized sup-
ply chain under no regulation is γDN := max
{
2(V−r0)b
(a−M−V )(cS−r1) , 0
}
.






Substituting q∗TN(wN) into (2.7) and with Assumption 2.2, it can be shown that Π
S
N
is jointly concave in wN and γN . Equating the first-order derivatives of Π
S
N with











Similar to Assumption 2.3, we assume that the parameters of the model are such
that regulation constrains business-as-usual for the decentralized supply chain as well.
Assumption 2.4 We assume V − r0 < ρ(a−M−V )(cS−r1)2b so that regulation constrains
business-as-usual for the decentralized supply chain.
Corollary 2.4 The optimal quantities and profits for the decentralized supply chain
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Comparing the results for the decentralized supply chain in Corollary 2.4 to those









TN due to double marginalization. Corollary 2.5 compares the virgin mate-
rial quantities in the decentralized and integrated supply chains under no regulation.
Corollary 2.5 For cS ≶ cI +∆S, where ∆S = a−M−V2b(V−r0)(cI − r1)(cS − r1), qDV N ≶ qIV N .
Thus, under no regulation, although the total quantity for the decentralized supply
chain is lower than that for the integrated supply chain, the virgin material quantity
could be greater for the decentralized supply chain if the supplier’s collection cost is
sufficiently high.
2.4.2 Decentralized Supply Chain: Recycling under Regulation
Under regulation, the manufacturer is responsible for ensuring that both the collection
mandate and the recycling mandate (which is greater than the supplier’s business-
as-usual recycling rate γDN ), are met. For tractability and to avoid trivial scenarios
merely because the manufacturer is responsible for meeting the mandates, we assume
that absent any incentive offered by the manufacturer for additional recycling activity,
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the supplier continues to recycle at rate γDN . Therefore, the manufacturer must collect
the quantity qMCR = (τ −γDN )qTR, decide the optimal amount of this collected quantity
to be recycled and offer it to the supplier at a unit transfer price η (possibly < 0), and
dispose of the remainder.8 Thus, for the decentralized supply chain under regulation,
the manufacturer has three decision variables, namely, qTR, γR(≥ ρ > γDN ), and η.
The supplier chooses wholesale price wR.
We assume that sufficient material is available for collection in steady state so
















ΠSR = wRqTR−V [1−γR]qTR−η[γR−γDN ]qTR−cS[γDN qTR]2−[r0γRqTR−r1 (γRqTR)2]
(2.10)
ΠMR in (2.9) is increasing in η. However, it can be shown that the supplier will
accept η and undertake recycling at the rate γR if η(qTR, γR) ≤ V −r0+(γR+γDN )r1qTR.
Therefore, the manufacturer’s optimal choice of η is:
η∗(qTR, γR) = V − r0 + (γR + γDN )r1qTR (2.11)
Proposition 2.5 presents the optimal recycling rate for the decentralized supply
chain under regulation.
Proposition 2.5 The optimal recycling rate for the decentralized supply chain under
8Alternatively, the manufacturer could subsidize the supplier’s collection and/or recycling costs
to ensure that the mandates are met. The main insights, however, remain unchanged.
9Modeling the manufacturer’s collection costs (say) as cM [(τqTR)2 − (γDN qTR)2] does not struc-
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Proof: Substituting η∗(qTR, γR) in (2.11) for η in (2.9), we have that ΠMR is concave
in qTR. Taking the first order derivative of Π
M
R with respect to qTR and equating to
0, we obtain:
q∗TR(wR, γR) =
a− wR −M + (γR − γDN )(V − r0)− (τ − γR)D
2
{
b + cM (τ − γDN )2 − r1 [(γR)2 − (γDN )2]
} (2.12)
The convexity of ΠMR in γR ∈ [ρ, τ ] implies that the manufacturer’s profit under reg-





R ) and η
∗(q∗TR, γ
D
R ) into (2.10), we have that Π
S
R is concave in wR.





R ) = V − γDN (V − r0)
+
[a−M − V + γDR (V − r0)− (τ − γDR )D]{b + cM(τ − γDN )2 + cS[γDN ]2 − r1[γDR ]2}
2b2(γDR )
(2.13)













Table 2.3 summarizes the results for the decentralized supply chain both under
no regulation (Section 2.4.1) and under regulation (Section 2.4.2), incorporating the
relationships in Corollary 2.6.
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Table 2.3: Results for the Decentralized Supply Chain
Note: a1 = a−M − V ; a2(·) := a1 + (·)[V − r0]− [τ − (·)]D;
b2(ρ) = b + cM τ
















Table 2.3A: γDN = 0, γ
D
R = ρ
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Corollary 2.6 For the decentralized supply chain, γDN > 0 ⇒ γDR = τ , and γDR = ρ ⇒
γDN = 0.
Proof: From (2.8), we have γDN > 0 ⇔ V − r0 > 0. From (2.9) and using the




> 0 and, hence, ⇒ ΠMR (qDTR(τ), τ) >
ΠMR (q
D




< 0 ⇒ V − r0 < 0, and V − r0 < 0 ⇔ γDN = 0.2
Comparing the results for the decentralized supply chain in Table 2.3 to those for











and ΠSN > Π
S
R, i.e., regulation decreases the profits of both the manufacturer and the
supplier. Similar to Corollary 2.2 for the integrated supply chain, Corollaries 2.7 and
2.8 compare the total and virgin material quantities for the decentralized supply chain
under no regulation and under regulation.
Corollary 2.7 When V − r0 ≤ 0 (i.e., γDN = 0), qDTR < qDTN and qDV R < qDV N ,
regardless of whether γDR = ρ or τ .
Proof: Follows from the expressions in Table 2.3, noting that b2(·) > b. 2
Corollary 2.8 When V − r0 > 0 (i.e., γDN = 2b(V−r0)a1(cS−r1) , and γDR = τ), [i.] ∃ ¯τDT ,




TN for τ ∈ [¯τDT , τ̄DT ]. [ii.] ∃ [¯τD, τ̄D] ⊂ [¯τDT , τ̄DT ] such that
qDV R > q
D
V N for τ ∈ [¯τD, τ̄D].
Proof: The first part of Corollary 2.8 follows from the expressions for qDTN and
qDTR in Table 2.3B. The second part follows from the fact that q
D
V N = (1 − γDN )qDTN ,
qDV R = (1 − τ)qDTR, γDN < τ , and that the quantities (as functions of recycling rates)
are well behaved. 2
Corollary 2.8[i.] shows that, analogous to the “Jevons effect” (Hentwich 2005),
for a particular range of the mandated collection target, regulation could increase the
total quantity produced by the decentralized supply chain since the manufacturer who
faces quadratic collection costs would rather offer his collected material to the supplier
for recycling (and thereafter undertake production), than incur disposal costs. The
interval [
¯
τDT , τ̄DT ] depends on the manufacturer’s collection cost (cM) and disposal
cost (D); for sufficiently small cM and large D, [
¯
τDT , τ̄DT ] approaches (ρ, 1]. Corollary
2.8[ii.] shows that additionally, for a subinterval of [
¯
τDT , τ̄DT ], the virgin material
quantity for the decentralized supply chain under regulation could exceed that under
no regulation.
Having established the results for the decentralized supply chain with the manu-
facturer solely responsible for meeting the collection and recycling mandates, we next
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examine the potential for improving supply chain performance through the sharing
of responsibility for product recovery.
2.5 Sharing Responsibility in the Decentralized Supply Chain
In this section, we analyze the impact of sharing responsibility for product recovery
on profits in the supply chain. We recognize that there are multiple mechanisms by
which responsibility can be shared, including the financial sharing of one or more of
the components of the program costs (i.e., collection, recycling, and disposal), and
the physical splitting of the target collection or recycling rates between the supply
chain echelons. We illustrate the impact of sharing responsibility by analyzing a
scenario where the additional collection cost (i.e., beyond business-as-usual, borne by
the manufacturer as per regulation) is shared between the manufacturer and supplier
in the decentralized supply chain. Note that the analysis would be similar if any of the
other components of the program costs or if the recovery targets are shared across
the echelons. Specifically, we model a collection cost-sharing parameter ψ, where
ψ ∈ (0, 1) is the portion of the additional collection costs shared by the supplier,
and 1 − ψ is the portion borne by the manufacturer. While we demonstrate how
such sharing of responsibility can improve overall supply chain profit, the additional
attractiveness of responsibility sharing lies in the perception of regulatory “fairness”
as well as congruence with the spirit of EPR as discussed earlier. Since the sharing of
responsibility alters the cost structure of both the manufacturer and the supplier and
affects their optimal quantity decisions, we provide an assessment of the impacts of
such sharing on social welfare, including environmental externalities associated with
virgin material extraction, product consumption, and disposal, in Section 2.6.
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2.5.1 Sharing Collection Costs under Regulation




ΠMR = [p− wR −M ]qTR + η[γR − γDN ]qTR − [1− ψ]cM [(τ − γDN )qTR]2
−D[τ − γR]qTR (2.14)
max
wR≥0
ΠSR = wRqTR − V [1− γR]qTR − η[γR − γDN ]qTR − cS[γDN qTR]2
−[r0γRqTR − r1 (γRqTR)2]− ψcM [(τ − γDN )qTR]2 (2.15)
We follow a similar sequence of analysis as in Section 2.4.2.10 For exposition, we
focus on the scenario where γDN = 0 and γ
D
R = τ (see Table 2.3B), noting that the
other regulatory scenarios (i.e., γDN = 0, γ
D
R = ρ, and γ
D
N > 0, γ
D
R = τ) can be analyzed
similarly. Table 2.4 summarizes the optimal outcomes with and without cost-sharing.
The expressions in the left-hand column are replicated from Table 2.3B, while the
right hand column includes the results under cost-sharing. The impacts of program
cost sharing on profits in the supply chain are provided in Observations 2.1 through
2.3.
Observation 2.1 Under cost sharing, ΠMR is concave decreasing in ψ.

















2[2b2(τ)− ψcMτ 2]4 < 0
2
Observation 2.2 Under cost sharing, ΠSR is convex increasing in ψ.














2[2b2(τ)− ψcMτ 2]3 > 0
10For concavity of the manufacturer’s profit in (2.14) with respect to qTR, we reasonably assume
that b2(τ)− ψcMτ2 > 0.
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Table 2.4: Comparison of Results without and with Program Cost Sharing
(Scenario: γDN = 0, γ
D
R = τ)
Note: a2(τ) := a−M − V + τ(V − r0); b2(τ) := b + cM τ2 − r1τ2
Without Sharing (from Table 2.3B) With Sharing



















































R is increasing and convex-
concave in ψ.














2[2b2(τ)− ψcMτ 2]4 ≷ 0 for b2(τ) ≷ 2ψcMτ
2
2
The above results demonstrate that the sharing of program costs can in fact im-
prove overall profitability of the decentralized supply chain. With the sharing of
program costs, the manufacturer chooses a higher total quantity and charges a higher
transfer price to the supplier for his collected material. However, with a single coordi-
nation parameter ψ specifying the sharing of program costs, the supplier appropriates
an increasing share of supply chain profit as ψ increases because of her ability to re-
cover (through the wholesale price) any rents accruing to the manufacturer.
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2.5.2 Pareto-Improving Contract Menu
The preceding discussion hints at the possibility of a multi-parameter contract involv-
ing program cost sharing that can ensure that both the supplier and the manufacturer




where the level of sharing is a function of the contracted wholesale price (or vice-
versa). The manufacturer’s and supplier’s profit functions are the same as in (2.14)
and (2.15), respectively, with the exception that the wholesale price wR is now con-
tracted rather than optimized by the supplier. As in Section 2.5.1, we focus on the
scenario where γDN = 0 and γ
D
R = τ . For brevity, we do not present the expressions
for the optimal quantities and profits, and omit proofs of the Observations below.11
Observation 2.4 For any contracted wR, Π
M
R is convex increasing in ψ.
Observation 2.5 For V < wR < w̄R := V +
[a2(τ)−wR+V ][b2(τ)+2ψcM τ2]
2[b2(τ)−ψcM τ2] , Π
S
R is concave
in ψ and is maximized at ψ̃(wR) := max
{
b2(τ)[3(wR−V )−a2(τ)]
cM τ2[(wR−V )+a2(τ)] , 0
}
.












Thus, Observations 2.4 through 2.6 show the existence of multiple Pareto-improving
combinations of the wholesale price and the cost-sharing level. We also note the fol-
lowing:
Corollary 2.9 ψ̂(wR) > ψ̃(wR).
Figure 2.1 presents a numerical illustration of the above Observations. Table




, both the manufacturer’s and the supplier’s profits are increasing in the
11Available from the authors.
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Figure 2.1: Profits under Shared Collection Cost and Contracted Wholesale Price
(wR)
(Scenario: γDN = 0, γ
D
R = τ)
level of cost sharing. Therefore, a straightforward approach is to select from the set
{(wR, ψ̃(wR)
)}, since the manufacturer’s profit is increasing in ψ whereas the sup-
plier’s profit is maximized at ψ̃. While a combination from {(wR, ψ̂(wR)
)} instead
would result in an even higher total supply chain profit, a redistribution of profits
would be required in order for the said combination to Pareto-dominate {(wR, ψ̃(wR)
)}.
Although program cost sharing has the benefit of improving profits in the supply
chain, it also increases virgin material use and the total quantity produced. The
impacts of program cost sharing on social welfare are therefore not obvious. Given
that product recovery programs are motivated primarily by environmental or soci-
etal concerns, we construct a holistic measure of social welfare that incorporates the
environmental externalities associated with virgin material extraction, product con-
sumption, and disposal, in addition to supply chain profits and consumer surplus.
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Table 2.5: Parameters Used in Numerical Illustrations
(Scenario: γDN = 0 and γ
D
R = τ)










wR 4.0 From Table 2.4
τ 0.75 [0,1]
λ – 1.0
Low Ek – 0.0
Medium Ek – 1.5
High Ek – 2.0
2.6 Social Welfare Impacts of Regulation and Cost Sharing
The environmental economics literature discusses the inclusion of externalities in
social welfare assessments (e.g., Anderson 1992, Wierenga 2003). For our setting,
social welfare is the sum of supply chain profit and consumer surplus, minus any
externalities (i.e., area stu+rsu−tuv in Figure 2.2a). EPR forces firms to internalize
some of the externalities in the form of program costs. As shown conceptually in
Figure 2.2b, adding program costs via EPR changes the optimal quantities, supply
chain profit, consumer surplus, externalities and, hence, social welfare. However,
even the most elaborate EPR programs cannot ensure the complete internalization
of environmental externalities; externalities given by area tuv in Figure 2.2b persist.
We attempt to characterize the externalities depicted by the area tuv in Figure 2.2b
and propose their consideration in the measurement of social welfare.
We define the social welfare (SW ) in any steady-state period as the sum of supply






































Figure 2.2: Impact of EPR on components of Social Welfare
externalities (TEi), weighted by a factor λ ≥ 0.
SW = ΠTi + CS − λTEi; λ ≥ 0 (2.16)
The weighting factor λ may accommodate either inaccuracies in the estimation of
externalities or varying emphasis on externalities due to political or economic reasons.
The specific values of virgin material, total consumed (qTi), and disposed quantities,
and total profit (ΠTi ) depend upon the specific case considered (i.e., either integrated
or decentralized supply chain under no regulation/regulation). In all cases, consumer
surplus CS = 1
2
qTi[a−p] = 12bq2Ti. Next, we describe the three types of environmental
externalities that constitute TEi.
2.6.1 Environmental Externalities
The externalities relevant to our setting include those associated with: 1) virgin mate-
rial extraction, 2) consumption of the product, and, 3) disposal of both collected and
uncollected product.12 The social costs of virgin material extraction include land use
intensity, untreated runoff, reclamation, effects on flora and fauna, resource depletion,
12We assume that the costs of regulatory compliance outside of EPR are already captured in the




and acid rain (Söderholm 2006). For products collected but not recycled under an
EPR program, the social costs of land use, aesthetics, leakage, and future remediation
are not fully reflected in the marginal disposal cost D (Huhtula 1997, Runkel 2003).
Additionally, products not collected at all do not even face the marginal disposal
cost D. Finally, the consumption of products results in societal costs that can be
measured through energy use, material flows, and intensity of land use (Spangenberg
2004). Although our model is analytical in nature, we recognize that the extensive
literature on environmental economics attempts to measure the social costs described
above through methods such as hedonic pricing, damage cost avoidance, replacement
cost, and contingent choice and valuation (Wierenga 2003). In addition, industrial
ecologists, through their work on life-cycle assessments (LCAs), provide measures of
external costs associated with economic activity (Matthews & Lifset 2007) that can
serve as a valuable resource to populate the parameters in modeling approaches such
as ours.
Although the literature generally agrees that externalities are increasing in the
corresponding quantities, the specific shapes of the functions are unknown (Kolstad
2000). We assume without loss of generality that the three externality types listed
above have constant marginal social costs (as in Calcott & Walls 2000, Lai 2004, and
Atasu et al. 2009), denoted as Ev, Ec, and Ed, respectively. The relative magni-
tudes of Ev, Ec, and Ed vary by product. For example, products that are natural
resource-intensive, particularly those that require non-renewable resources, may ex-
hibit large Ev but small Ec if the products are not energy-intensive to operate (e.g.,
petroleum-based plastic products and metal fabrications). Products with hazardous
content or that otherwise require extraordinary disposal space or effort (e.g., certain
electrical/electronic equipment, and mattresses) have large Ed values. Products that
are energy-intensive to operate (e.g., automobiles, home appliances) have large Ec
values.
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Table 2.6: Marginal Environmental Externalities
Scenario MEi
No Regulation, γN ≥ 0 (1− γN )Ev + Ec + (1− γN )Ed
Regulation, γR = ρ (1− ρ)Ev + Ec + (1− τ)Ed + (τ − ρ)(Ed −D)
Regulation, γR = τ (1− τ)Ev + Ec + (1− τ)Ed
Denoting x as the fraction of total quantity qTi that is collected, and y as the
fraction of total quantity that is recycled, TEi in (2.16) can be written as:




(x− y)qTi(Ed −D) + (1− x)qTiEd
]
(2.17)
x− y is the fraction of total quantity that is collected but not recycled, and 1− x is
the fraction that is not collected at all. We note that (2.17) could also be written as
a weighted combination if the three externality types are to receive different levels of
emphasis. Since qV i = (1− y)qTi, we can write TEi as:
TEi = (1− y)qTiEv + qT iEc +
[
(x− y)qTi(Ed −D) + (1− x)qT iEd
]
:= qTiMEi
where MEi := (1 − y)Ev + Ec +
[
(x− y)(Ed −D) + (1− x)Ed] is the marginal
environmental externality per unit of total quantity produced. Table 2.6 includes the
expressions for the marginal externality (for both the integrated and the decentralized
supply chains) under no regulation and under regulation. The expression for social
welfare in (2.16) can therefore be rewritten as:




Considering total supply chain profit (ΠTi ) as a proxy for economic activity (or
performance)13 and externalities (TEi) as a measure of environmental impact, we
13Given the scope of our work, using total supply chain profit as a proxy for economic activity
does not consider indirect benefits such as improved reputation, access to new markets, and better
employee morale that may accompany improvements in environmental performance.
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use the taxonomy in Geyer and Jackson (2004) to categorize the outcomes of EPR
regulation relative to the no-regulation benchmark. In Figure 2.3, Quadrant I can
be classified as a “win-win” for economic and environmental outcomes, respectively.
Similarly, Quadrant II is “win-lose”, Quadrant III is “lose-win”, and Quadrant IV
is “lose-lose”. For both the integrated and decentralized supply chains, regulation
decreases supply chain profit (see Sections 2.3.2 and 2.4.2). From Corollary 2.2 for
the integrated supply chain, the virgin material and total quantities under regulation
are always lower than the corresponding quantities under no regulation. Therefore,
only Quadrant III is possible for the integrated supply chain. However, Corollaries
2.7 and 2.8 for the decentralized supply chain show that the virgin material and total
quantities can in fact increase with regulation and therefore both Quadrants III and
IV are possible for the decentralized supply chain. While the sharing of program costs
within the decentralized supply chain increases supply chain profits (i.e., increases the
likelihood of being in Quadrant III), it also increases the virgin material and total
quantities (see Table 2.4) and therefore also increases the likelihood of being in Quad-
rant IV. Thus, the above discussion shows that it is critical for the social planner to
recognize both the economic and environmental implications of EPR program design,
including the possible sharing of product recovery responsibility, so as to avoid a net
negative social welfare impact relative to the no-regulation benchmark. To illustrate
the importance of appropriately capturing the interactions between regulatory choices
and economic and environmental outcomes, we provide a numerical example below.
2.6.2 Numerical Example
Using a numerical example, we illustrate the impacts of regulation – specifically,
the recycling rate under regulation γR and the program cost-sharing parameter ψ
(Section 2.5.1) – on the economic and environmental components of social welfare for































Figure 2.3: Economic and Environmental Performance
marginal externalities MER under the regulatory scenario γ
D
N = 0 and γ
D
R = τ . Table
2.5 includes the parameter values used in the example.
In our example, when externalities are absent or sufficiently small (Figure 2.4a),
the primary impact of an increase in the recycling rate is a reduction in supply chain
profit and a resulting decrease in social welfare. Note that the effect of program cost
sharing is small, but increasing in τ due to the increasing program costs involved.
When the marginal externality is at a moderate level (Figure 2.4b), the behavior of
social welfare is markedly different; social welfare is non-monotonic in τ and the effect
of program cost sharing is more pronounced. When externalities are large (Figure
2.4c), the reduction in externalities due to an increase in the recycling rate dominates
the decrease in supply chain profit, resulting in increased social welfare. For large
MER, program cost sharing (ψ) has a small but positive impact on social welfare.
14
While the numerical example above is not intended to be exhaustive, it highlights
how the social welfare outcomes of EPR programs are intricate and that care should
14Our numerical example considers the marginal social costs Ev, Ec, and Ed, collectively through
different levels of MER. Clearly, separate numeric sensitivity analyses could be performed for each







Figure 2.4: Social Welfare as a function of Recycling Rate and Level of Program
Cost Sharing
(Scenario: γDN = 0 and γ
D
R = τ)
be taken in designing them in order to ensure a balance between economic and en-
vironmental performance. Such a balance is not necessarily guaranteed by sharing
responsibility for product recovery due to the fact that while responsibility sharing im-
proves supply chain profit, it also increases virgin material use and the total quantity
produced. The results from an analysis such as in our work coupled with estimates
of key social cost parameters enabled through the innovative approaches in the fields
of environmental economics and industrial ecology (as described earlier), can provide
valuable input to social planners in choosing appropriate recovery targets and levels
of cost sharing.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper discusses the economic and environmental impacts of Extended Producer
Responsibility (EPR) programs that mandate targets for product collection and recy-
cling in supply chains. To address the research questions of interest, we develop and
analyze steady-state models of both an integrated and a decentralized two-echelon
supply chain. The context for our model is a supplier who provides raw material to
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a manufacturer; the manufacturer’s product is recyclable and the recycled material
is a substitute for virgin raw material.
We first examine the impacts of EPR program targets on optimal quantities and
profits. While the imposition of regulation reduces supply chain profits for both the
integrated and decentralized supply chains, the amount of virgin material used as well
as the total quantity produced can increase in the decentralized supply chain with the
advent of EPR regulation. A crucial yet common feature of EPR programs is the iden-
tification of a single actor (the manufacturer, in our model) within the supply chain
as the producer who is responsible for ensuring that the mandated targets are met.
We explore the important implications of instead sharing responsibility for product
recovery between the actors in the supply chain. Although we demonstrate that the
sharing of program costs always improves total supply chain profit, such cost sharing
is also accompanied with an increase in the amount of virgin material used and the
total quantity produced. Also, given the supplier’s ability to appropriate the benefits
of program cost sharing through the wholesale price charged to the manufacturer, we
suggest a contract menu consisting of appropriate combinations of the wholesale price
and the level of program cost sharing that can Pareto-improve profits in the supply
chain. Recognizing that virgin material extraction, product consumption, and prod-
uct disposal are associated with societal impacts not entirely internalized through
EPR program costs, we construct a holistic measure of social welfare that explicitly
considers the externalities of virgin material extraction, product consumption, and
disposal, together with supply chain profit and consumer surplus. Using a numerical
example, we motivate the importance of appropriately considering these societal im-
pacts in the establishment of collection and recycling targets and cost sharing ratios
within supply chains.
Our contribution to the extant literature in operations management that treats
the interface between operational decisions and the environment lies in furthering the
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understanding of the economic and environmental impacts of ever-expanding EPR
programs. The analytical results in our work, coupled with numeric assessments of
the societal costs of externalities from the fields of environmental economics and in-
dustrial ecology, can provide rich input to firms anticipating, lobbying against, or
already subject to product recovery regulation, and also to regulators who deliberate
on the establishment of (or modifications to) recovery targets and responsibility al-
locations across supply chains. The possibility for program cost sharing to improve
profits for all actors in the supply chain suggests that, rather than shying away from
responsibility for program costs altogether, firms in the supply chain may find it in
their interest to accept an appropriate level of sharing. From a regulatory standpoint,
the Pareto-improvement of profits may suggest an amicable cost-sharing mandate;
however, the accompanying societal impacts must be carefully weighed against the
economic benefits.
In concluding, we reiterate that mandated sharing of product recovery responsibil-
ity, if appropriately implemented, has the potential to reduce the burden of recovery
programs through improved supply chain profitability while also improving social wel-
fare. Aside from the benefits to profitability and social welfare, there are the indirect
benefits of providing a greater number of participants with a stake in the program’s
success, encouraging inter-firm cooperation, or strengthening industry-government
relationships, that the sharing of product recovery responsibility can help foster.
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CHAPTER III
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE AND THE
MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM
3.1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the shareholder value effects of environmental performance by
measuring the stock market reaction (abnormal returns) associated with announce-
ments of environmental performance. We examine the market reaction to two cate-
gories of environmental performance. The first category is announcements that pro-
vide information about self-reported corporate efforts to avoid, mitigate, or offset the
environmental impacts of the firm’s products, services, or processes. We refer to such
announcements as Corporate Environmental Initiatives (CEIs). We test the market
reaction to the broad category of CEIs as well as its subcategories of specific an-
nouncement types. The second category is announcements that provide information
about recognition granted by third parties specifically for environmental performance.
We refer to such announcements as Environmental Awards and Certifications (EACs),
and examine the market reactions to both the broad category of EACs as well as its
specific subcategories. We also contrast the market reactions to CEIs and EACs.
The issues addressed in this paper are important for a number of reasons. First,
Skapinker (2008) highlights the proactive sustainability initiatives of Unilever and
Wal-Mart to frame the ongoing debate over whether such initiatives are merely win-
dow dressing. Even though Wal-Mart’s energy conservation and recycling initiatives
and Unilever’s forays into low-cost water purification and eco-friendly detergents are
well received by the popular press, the question remains as to whether the market
42
perceives the returns on such initiatives to be as attractive as returns on alterna-
tive investment opportunities. In other words, can a firm increase shareholder value
through improvements in its environmental performance? The controversy continues
to receive attention in the press (for example, see Elgin 2007, Thomson 2006). Pro-
ponents claim that direct economic benefits from CEIs improve return on investment
and market value. Benefits include energy, raw material, and abatement cost reduc-
tions, as well as intangible advantages of improved consumer perception, community
relations, employee morale, and access to new markets. Skepticism remains, however,
due to the perceived high costs of improving environmental performance, and the un-
certain and longer-term payoffs from such efforts (Engardio, Capell, Carey, and Hall
2007). By examining the market reaction to environmental performance, we provide
evidence for the debate on the potential for environmental initiatives to create value.
Second, academics have studied the relationship between environmental perfor-
mance and financial performance, both theoretically (Walley and Whitehead 1994,
Hart 1995, and Porter and van der Linde 1995) as well as empirically (Ullman 1985,
Margolis and Walsh 2003). Friedman (1970) argues that any environmental expenses
beyond those required for regulatory compliance are not in the best interest of share-
holders and will result in degradation of firm performance and value. However, Bar-
nett and Salomon (2006) suggest that good social performance attracts resources
to the firm, including better quality employees and expanded market opportunities.
Since proactive approaches to environmental performance require greater intangi-
ble skills (e.g., cross-disciplinary activity and problem solving) than do reactive ap-
proaches, related efforts create more valuable resources and can be a superior source
of competitive advantage (Hart 1995, Russo and Fouts 1997). On the other hand,
Walley and Whitehead (1994) propose that instances where environmental efforts
can improve firm performance are rare. In analyzing the market reaction to a broad
range of environmental initiatives, we shed light on whether such initiatives affect
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firm value.
Third, although the dominant view today is that good environmental performance
translates into improved financial performance, empirical results have been inconclu-
sive and even conflicting. These mixed results highlight the complex nature of the
link between environmental and financial performance (Corbett and Klassen 2006).
The empirical research methods employing secondary data can be categorized into
three types: portfolio studies, regression studies, and event studies (King and Lenox
2001, Guenster, Derwall, Bauer, and Koedijk 2006). Portfolio studies determine
whether the return on a portfolio of firms with good environmental performance
outperforms the market. Regression analyses are used to establish long-term rela-
tionships between environmental performance and accounting-based measures of firm
performance. These studies require careful matching of the firms under study with
control firms to estimate any departures from “normal” financial performance during
the study period. Due to the relatively long time periods over which such studies are
conducted, they are sensitive to the host of other possible explanatory factors of firm
performance.
On the other hand, event studies (which aim to estimate market value impacts
of specific events), use environmental announcements as a proxy for environmental
performance. A statistically significant market reaction to announcements of envi-
ronmental performance would indicate a causal link. Event studies have been used
in the literature to determine the impacts of both positive and negative environmen-
tal events, e.g., product and process-related initiatives (Gilley, Worrell, Davidson,
and El-Jelly 2000), environmental awards and crises (Klassen and McLaughlin 1996),
and lawsuits (Karpoff, Lott, and Wehrly 2005). The work of Klassen and McLaugh-
lin (1996), and Gilley et al. (2000) is particularly relevant to our work. Klassen and
McLaughlin (1996) document the market reaction to independent, third-party awards
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for environmental performance. Using a sample of 110 announcements during the pe-
riod 1986-1991, they find that environmental awards are associated with a statistically
significant average market reaction of 0.82%. Gilley et al. (2000) study the market
reaction to environmental activities that improve processes and products. Based on
a sample of 71 announcements from The Wall Street Journal during 1983-1996, they
find that process-related announcements result in a statistically significant average
market reaction of −0.45% but the market does not react significantly to product-
related announcements.
Our research extends earlier work but also differs from it in several important
aspects. First, our approach considers a wide variety of specific CEIs rather than just
process and product-related initiatives considered by Gilley et al. (2000). Second,
our study of environmental awards builds upon the work of Klassen and McLaughlin
(1996) to examine whether, in the time since their study, the increased pervasive-
ness of and publicity surrounding environmental efforts has affected the market value
of firms that receive recognition for such efforts. Third, we expand upon Klassen
and McLaughlin’s work by testing environmental certifications, which were new to
the US market at the time of their study but are prevalent today. The impacts
of Environmental Management System (EMS) certifications (such as ISO 14001) on
firm performance have mainly been studied using survey data (Delmas 2001, Melnyk,
Sroufe, and Calantone 2003). To the best of our knowledge, the literature has not
examined the market reaction to EMS certifications. Fourth, by including both CEIs
and EACs in our study, we are able to examine the difference between the market
reaction to self-disclosed information and to third-party assessments of environmen-
tal performance. Finally, we study the market reaction to specific types of CEIs and
EACs, many of which have not been examined in the literature.
Our results are based on an analysis of 811 announcements (430 CEI announce-
ments and 381 EAC announcements) that appeared in the daily business press during
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the period 2004-2006. Although the market does not react significantly to the aggre-
gated CEI and EAC categories, the market does react significantly to certain types
of CEI and EAC announcements. Specifically, we find that announcements of: 1)
philanthropic gifts for environmental causes, result in statistically significant positive
market reaction; 2) pledges or realizations of voluntary emission reductions, result
in statistically significant negative market reaction; and 3) attainment of ISO 14001
certification, result in statistically significant positive market reaction. The difference
between the market reactions to the aggregate CEI and EAC categories is statistically
insignificant. Thus, we find that the market is selective in reacting to announcements
of environmental performance with certain types of announcements even valued neg-
atively.
The next section develops our hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the data col-
lection effort and the sample. Section 3.4 provides a discussion of the event study
methodology. Section 3.5 presents the empirical evidence and results. Section 3.6
summarizes the paper and provides directions for future research.
3.2 Hypotheses
We use the framework in Figure 3.1 to develop our hypotheses of the impact of
environmental performance on financial performance. In addition to the direct effects
of environmental performance on revenue gains and cost reductions, innovation can
enhance these effects (Porter and van der Linde 1995). Researchers have proposed
different mechanisms for environmental performance to influence revenue gains, cost
reductions, and innovation. An examination of these mechanisms illustrates how CEIs
can impact firm value.
Revenue growth can be achieved either through improved execution in existing
markets or access to new markets. Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) propose that
























Figure 3.1: Linking Environmental Performance and Financial Performance
of positive environmental performance. They argue that demonstration of reduced
environmental impacts of products and processes, and the establishment of an EMS
can improve brand reputation. Dowell, Hart, and Yeung (2000) also note that the
development and maintenance of stringent environmental management standards can
have positive reputational effects. Corbett and Muthulingam (2007) propose that a
primary reason for firms to pursue Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
(LEED) certification for building construction is to signal environmental concern to
regulators, employees, and the public. Brand recognition and corporate reputation
can also be enhanced through “strategic philanthropy” to support environmental
causes (Seifert, Morris, and Bartkus 2003). Similarly, other environmentally conscious
initiatives, such as alternative energy purchases or investments to reduce emissions
below regulatory requirements, can signal a firm’s concern for the environment and
could have a positive impact on corporate reputation.
Access to new markets can be another important benefit of improved environmen-
tal performance. Evolving environmentally conscious markets with their increasing
desire for eco-friendly products, can lead to new sales opportunities (Porter and van
der Linde 1995). Examples range from high-fashion clothing produced with organic
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materials (Binkley 2007), to hybrid vehicles and data centers that consume less en-
ergy (Bulkeley 2007). In the public sector, US federal agencies, with $350 billion in
annual purchases, are mandated to consider environmental criteria in their purchasing
decisions (EPA 2008).
In addition to its effects on revenues, environmental performance can impact
costs in a variety of ways. Environmental practices reduce the amount of waste,
the consumption of various production inputs including energy (Rothenberg, Pil, and
Maxwell 2001) and material usage (Sroufe 2003), and the number of components in
products (Ashley 1993). Both inbound and outbound logistics benefit from reduced
product weights and packaging (Rao and Holt 2005). Pollution prevention may not
only reduce disposal and mitigation costs but also avoid the cost of installing and
operating pollution control devices (Hart 1995, Hart and Ahuja 1996). Other cost
avoidance benefits of effective environmental management include mitigation of risks
of losses from crises or regulation (Reinhardt 1999), and preventing expenses associ-
ated with lawsuits and legal settlements (Karpoff et al. 2005). Dowell et al. (2000)
note that stringent environmental standards can lower the cost to develop, maintain,
and enforce policies and procedures, thus allowing easy transfer of accrued knowledge
and increasing employee morale and productivity. Similarly, von Paumgartten (2003)
argues that LEED-certified buildings can improve worker productivity and retention.
As depicted in Figure 1, both revenue growth and cost reductions can be enhanced
by innovation spurred by demands from regulators, consumers, and other stakehold-
ers (Porter and van der Linde 1995). Examples include technologies that improve
resource productivity, and new or enhanced eco-friendly product designs. For ex-
ample, 3M’s Pollution Prevention Pays program has helped 3M achieve substantial
savings through innovations related to waste reduction, process improvement, en-
ergy conservation, and product design. Using case studies from automotive assembly
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paint shops, Geffen and Rothenberg (2000) discuss how tighter regulations or compet-
itive pressures lead to manufacturer-supplier partnerships and subsequent adoption
of innovative technologies that simultaneously improve environmental performance
and reduce costs. Klassen and Whybark (1999) discuss examples of investments in
pollution prevention leading to innovative manufacturing processes in the furniture
industry.
Given the above discussion, our first hypothesis is
Hypothesis 3.1 The market reacts positively to CEIs.
The CEI types that have been empirically tested in the event study literature
include product and process-related initiatives (Gilley et al. 2000), participation in
voluntary environmental programs such as US EPA Climate Leaders (Fisher-Vanden
and Thorburn 2008), and voluntary commitments towards pollution abatement (Das-
gupta, LaPlante, and Mamingi 2001). As will be discussed later, we classify CEI an-
nouncements into seven distinct subcategories. While there is some overlap between
the types of CEI announcements in our sample and the types of initiatives previously
examined in the literature, there are important types of initiatives that have not been
empirically examined before. These include environmental philanthropy, eco-friendly
products, and the use or supply of renewable energy. To provide further insight, we
provide descriptive results for each CEI subcategory. A priori, we expect that the
market will react positively to each of the seven CEI subcategories.
CEI announcements represent self-disclosed information by the firm without in-
dependent verification of the initiatives. EACs, however, are the result of third-party
reviews of environmental performance. In the quality management context, the pos-
itive impact of third-party assessments on financial performance is documented by
Hendricks and Singhal (1996) for awards and by Corbett, Montes-Sancho, and Kirsch
(2005) for ISO 9001 certification. Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) find that announce-
ments of environmental awards lead to a significant positive market reaction. Using
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surveys, Delmas (2001) finds that the degree and type of stakeholder involvement in
ISO 14001 certification affects the firm’s resulting competitive advantage. Also using
surveys, Melnyk et al. (2003) demonstrate that both financial performance and envi-
ronmental performance are associated with the level of formality of the firm’s EMS,
with an ISO 14001 certified EMS correlated with the best overall performance. Thus,
our second hypothesis is
Hypothesis 3.2 The market reacts positively to EACs.
Due to the differing criteria and standards used by various certification and award
granting agencies, the market reaction could be sensitive to the type of certification
or award-giver (Hendricks and Singhal 1996, Klassen and McLaughlin 1996). To an-
alyze this, we separate our EAC announcements into two certification subcategories,
namely, ISO 14001 and LEED, and three award-givers subcategories, namely, federal,
state or local government, and non-government award-givers. We supplement H3.2
by presenting descriptive results for each of the five EAC subcategories.
Finally, we posit that a firm’s successful attainment of third-party recognition
as reflected in an EAC announcement sends a stronger signal of environmental per-
formance to the market than a CEI announcement. Prior to issuing awards or cer-
tifications, third-parties typically examine detailed company information and often
conduct onsite reviews. Such objective evidence is likely to be valued more by the
market. Given the greater objectivity of third-party awards and certifications, our
third hypothesis is
Hypothesis 3.3 The market reaction to EACs is greater than that for CEIs.
3.3 Sample and Data Description
To generate our sample, we use a preliminary set of keywords to collect a small
set of CEI and EAC announcements from different publications. We read these an-
nouncements to identify additional phrases and words that are commonly used in
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announcements of environmental initiatives, awards, and certifications. Panel A of
Table 3.1 presents the keywords that we use in our search. We search the headlines
Table 3.1: Keywords and Sources used in Search for Announcements
Panel A: Keywords Used in Search for Announcements
(conservation or conservational or eco or ecosystem or ecology or ecological or environment or environ-
mental or green or greener or greenest or greening or greened or recycle or recycles or recycling)
Near7
(accomplishment or accomplishments or admire or admiration or admirable or advantage or advantages
or analysis or announcement or approve or approves or approval or approvals or award or awards or
awarded or best or breakthrough or breakthroughs or celebrate or celebrates or celebration or celebrations
or certification certified or consult or consultant or contribute or contributes or contribution or discovery
or distinction or donate or donates or donation or donations or effort or efforts or endeavor or endeavors
or endowment or example or excellent or excellence or exceptional or exemplary or gift or gifts or grant
or grants or granted or great or greatest or honor or honors or honored or idea or ideas or initiative or
innovate or innovates or innovation or innovations or innovative or invent or invents or invention or inven-
tions or inventive or involvement or key or lead or leads or leader or leadership or master or mastery or
message or messages or model or outstanding or patent or patents or patented or preeminent or preemi-
nence or principle or principles or principled or prize or prizes or program or proactive or proclamation or
proclamations or quality or qualities or qualify or qualified or qualification or recognize or recognizes or
recognition or recognitions or reputation or research or researcher or respect or respected or reward or
rewards rewarded or solution or standard or standards or star or strategy or strategies or strategic or study
or success or successes or successful or super or superb or technology or technologies or top or tribute or
tributes or tremendous or trust or venture or win or wins or won)
Panel B: Search Sources
Business Wire Houston Chronicle The New York Times
Chicago Tribune Los Angeles Times The Wall Street Journal
Denver Post New York Daily News USA Today
Dow Jones Business News Philadelphia Inquirer Washington Post
Financial Times PR Newswire (US)
and lead paragraphs of announcements in the three major business wire services, the
ten most widely circulated US daily newspapers, and the leading European business
daily during the period 2004-2006. Panel B of Table 3.1 lists the sources that we use
in the search. We download all announcements that meet the search criteria in these
publications. We read the full text of each announcement and exclude the following
types of announcement from our search results:
• Announcements that are environmental in nature but strictly pertain to gov-
ernmental agencies, NGOs, trade associations, non-profit organizations, non-
publicly traded firms, environmental services companies, or individuals.
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• Announcements that are very minor in nature. Frooman (1997) recognizes
announcements worthy of being studied as those that substantially affect the
welfare of identifiable stakeholders. With that in mind, we exclude minor an-
nouncements such as sponsorships of local events.
• Duplicate announcements that appear in more than one publication. In such
cases, we retain the announcement with the earliest publication date.
• Multiple announcements for the same firm within a span of five trading days.
We exclude these announcements since any market reactions for the firm would
be confounded among multiple events.
Our final sample consists of 811 announcements (430 CEI and 381 EAC announce-
ments) spanning 355 unique firms. Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics of our
sample. The sample has wide variation in firm characteristics but is weighted to-
ward larger firms. The sample includes firms from 21 unique two-digit and 57 unique
three-digit NAICS codes.
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of 811 Announcements. Sample
Statistics are Based on the Most Recent Fiscal Year Completed Before the Date of
the Announcement.
Market Value Total Assets Sales Net Income Employees Debt-Equity EPS
($M) ($M) ($M) ($M) (000s) Ratio ($)
Mean 41,407.0 77,616.9 38,435.4 2,290.4 108.6 0.356 8.42
Median 13,057.4 15,082.0 11,018.0 493.7 26.0 0.297 1.97
Std Dev 75,308.4 218,439.8 69,262.2 5,374.2 272.8 0.230 171.02
Max 439,013.3 1,884,318.0 345,977.0 39,500.0 1,900.0 2.218 4,753.00
Min 32.2 14.8 4.3 −12, 613.0 0.1 0.033 −32.92
To investigate the impacts of specific CEIs, we separate our sample into the follow-
ing seven subcategories based on announcement content and the CEI types identified
in the literature:
• Environmental Business Strategies : Acquisitions of environmental-friendly ca-
pabilities, joint ventures or alliances, and new corporate environmental policies
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or standards.
• Environmental Philanthropy : Substantial gifts for environmental causes, such
as natural conservation; the majority of such announcements are cash gifts
although some are in kind, such as easements of land.
• Voluntary Emission Reductions : Pledges, investments, or achievements related
to reducing emissions levels beyond those required by regulation.
• Eco-Friendly Products : Introductions of eco-friendly products, environmental
enhancements to existing products, or the incorporation of future regulatory
requirements into existing products.
• Renewable Energy : Supply or purchase of power from alternative energy sources.
• Recycling : Recycling of post-consumer waste, recycling intended to reduce raw
material consumption, and recycling programs intended to benefit non-profit
groups.
• Miscellaneous : All remaining CEI announcements, which includes decisions to
join environmental groups or councils, energy conservation efforts, development
of new eco-friendly technologies, and other corporate programs or initiatives
outside of the aforementioned categories.
Panel A of Table 3.3 lists the sample sizes of the seven CEI subcategories. Some
examples of CEI announcements include:
• “Caterpillar Sets Aggressive Greenhouse Gas Reduction Target, Goal is Part
of EPA’s Climate Leaders program”, PR Newswire (US), 18 January 2005.
Caterpillar pledged to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 20% from 2002
levels, by 2010.
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• “Liz Claiborne Inc. Adopts prAna Natural Power Initiative”, PR Newswire
(US), 3 November 2005. Liz Claiborne Inc. announced that it would purchase
only wind power for its New Jersey headquarters.
• “Abitibi-Consolidated Launches its largest Recycling Expansion; Paper Re-
triever begins collection in seven additional US markets”, PR Newswire (US),
15 November 2005. Abitibi announced expansion of its paper recycling program
from 16 to 23 US cities.
Table 3.3: Sample Sizes of Announcement Subcategories
Sample Size
Panel A: Corporate Environmental Initiatives (CEIs) 430
Environmental Business Strategies 53
Environmental Philanthropy 31





Panel B: Environmental Awards and Certifications (EACs) 381
ISO 14001 Certifications 51
LEED Certifications 22
Federal Awards 100
State/Local Government Awards 65
Non-Government Awards 143
Our sample also contains 381 EAC announcements. We include RC 14001 certifi-
cations within the EAC subcategory of ISO 14001 certifications. Modeled after ISO
14001, RC 14001 is a chemical industry standard developed by Responsible Carer
but with additional industry requirements. The awards mentioned in EAC announce-
ments are specifically those given to recognize environmental performance, including
pollution prevention, energy conservation, and habitat conservation. Granting agen-
cies include both government and non-government entities. Not included are awards
in which environmental performance is just one of multiple criteria for the award (e.g.,
54
awards granted to suppliers for excellence in quality, cost, delivery, and environmental
performance).
Panel B of Table 3.3 presents the sample sizes for the five EAC subcategories.
Examples of EAC announcements include:
• “Smithfield Achieves International ‘Gold Standard’ for its Environmental Man-
agement Practices”, PR Newswire (US), 27 April 2005. Smithfield attained
ISO 14001 certification for the EMS used at its US-based hog production and
processing facilities.
• “Corning’s Wilmington, N.C., Optical Fiber Manufacturing Facility To Be
Recognized as an Environmental Steward”, Business Wire, 2 March 2005. A
Corning plant was recognized as an “Environmental Steward” by the North Car-
olina Department of Environment and Natural Resources for its environmental
performance.
3.4 Methodology
We use event study methodology to estimate the market reaction to the announce-
ments of environmental performance. This methodology offers a rigorous approach to
estimate market returns associated with specific events, while controlling for market-
wide influences on stock prices (see Brown and Warner 1980, 1985, and MacKinlay
1997 for a review of this methodology). The “adjusted” or “abnormal” returns pro-
vide an estimate of the percent change in stock price associated with an event. The
underpinning of event study methodology is that, in an efficient market, the wealth
impact of an event will be reflected immediately in the stock price. Thus, a measure of
such impact can be obtained by observing stock prices over a relatively short interval
of time.
The first step in executing an event study is determining the event period – the
period over which to estimate abnormal returns. Consistent with the approach used
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in most event studies (e.g., Arora 2001, Hendricks and Singhal 2003, Karpoff et al.
2005), we use a two-day event period consisting of the day of the announcement and
the preceding trading day. To translate calendar days into event days, we designate
the announcement publication day as Day 0. If the announcement is made on either
a non-trading day or after 4:00pm Eastern Time on a trading day, the subsequent
trading day is treated as Day 0. All other days in the study are measured relative to
Day 0. Thus, the trading day immediately preceding the announcement day is Day
−1, while that immediately following the announcement day is Day 1.
Although several competing models have been proposed to estimate abnormal re-
turns, Brown and Warner (1985) show that estimates of the magnitude and statistical
significance of abnormal returns are relatively insensitive to the model used. Con-
sistent with most event studies, we use the “market model” to estimate abnormal
returns. This model posits a linear relationship between the return on a stock and
the market return (i.e., the return on the market portfolio) over a given time period
as:
Rit = αi + βiRmt + εit (3.1)
where Rit is the return of stock i on Day t, Rmt is the market return on Day t, αi is
the intercept of the relationship for stock i, βi is the slope of the relationship for stock
i with respect to the market return, and εit is the error term for stock i on Day t.
The term βiRmt is the portion of stock i’s return attributable to market movements.
The error term εit is the portion of the return that cannot be explained by market
movements and therefore captures the effect of firm-specific information. To compute




of the error term εit) using ordinary least squares regression (see equation (3.1)) over
the estimation period of 200 trading days. We begin the estimation period from Day
−210 and end it on Day −11. We end the estimation period two weeks (10 trading
days) prior to the event day in order to shield the estimates from the effects of the
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announcement and to ensure that any non-stationarities in the estimates are not an
issue. In estimating the parameters we require that a firm must have a minimum of
40 stock returns during the estimation period of 200 trading days.
The abnormal return Ait for firm i on Day t is computed as the difference between
the actual return of firm i and its expected return:
Ait = Rit − (α̂i + β̂iRmt)







where N is the number of announcements in the sample. To test the statistical
significance of the mean abnormal return in equation (3.2), each abnormal return Ait
is divided by its estimated standard deviation Ŝεi to yield a standardized abnormal
return. Since the abnormal returns are assumed to be independent across firms, with
mean 0 and variance Ŝ2εi , we know from the central limit theorem that the sum of the
N standardized abnormal returns is approximately normal with mean 0 and variance






We use a t-test to determine the statistical significance of the mean abnormal return.





The test statistic TSe for a period spanning multiple days is derived in a manner













To check for the influence of outliers, we supplement the t-tests with two non-
parametric tests. We test for the statistical significance of the median abnormal
return using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. We use the generalized sign test to
determine if the percent positive abnormal returns during the event period is sig-
nificantly higher than that during the estimation period. For example, a sample of
50 announcements will have 10,000 abnormal returns during a 200-day estimation
period. If 5,100 of these returns are positive, 51.0% positive abnormal returns is
established as the null. The percent positive of the 50 abnormal returns during the
event period are then compared to the null and a Z-statistic is generated using the
normal approximation to the binomial distribution. Note that for all three tests, we
report one-tailed p-values since we hypothesize that abnormal returns are positive.
We look for consistencies among the three tests to ensure the robustness of our results.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 CEI Announcements
For the full sample of 430 CEI announcements, Panel A of Table 3.4 presents the
market reaction for the day preceding the announcement (Day −1), the day of the
announcement (Day 0), and the two-day event period (Days −1 and 0). The mean
abnormal returns for Days −1, 0, and the two-day event period are all positive (0.03%,
0.09%, and 0.12%, respectively) with the returns for Day 0 and the two-day event
period significantly different from zero at the 10% level. The median abnormal return
for the two-day event period is 0.03%, but is statistically insignificant (Wilcoxon
Signed-Rank Z-statistic is 0.60). Our results also indicate that 51.2% of the abnormal
returns for the two-day event period are positive, insignificantly different than the
percent positive abnormal returns during the estimation period (Generalized Sign Z-
statistic is 1.24). Results for the five-day period preceding the announcements do not
indicate statistically significant market reaction either. Thus, the results indicate that
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the market does not react significantly to the entire category of CEI announcements.
Table 3.4: Event Period Abnormal Returns for the 430 Corporate Environmental
Initiative (CEI) Announcements
Panel A: Corporate Environmental Initiatives (CEIs)
Day −1 Day 0 Days −1 and 0
Mean Abnormal Return 0.03% 0.09% 0.12%
t-Statistic 0.44 1.54∗ 1.40∗
Median Abnormal Return −0.02% −0.04% 0.03%
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Z-Statistic 0.67 0.17 0.60
% Abnormal Returns Positive 49.8% 48.4% 51.2%
Generalized Sign Test Z-Statistic 0.66 0.08 1.24
Panel B: CEI Subcategory Results for Event Period (Days −1 and 0)
Mean t Median Wilcoxon % Generalized
Subcategory N Abnormal Statistic Abnormal Signed- Positive Sign
Return Return Rank Z Z
Environmental Business Strategies 53 0.72% 2.92∗∗∗ −0.01% 0.38 49.1% 0.15
Environmental Philanthropy 31 0.45% 1.38∗ 0.43% 1.57∗ 64.5% 1.88∗∗
Voluntary Emission Reductions 41 −0.90% −2.86∗∗∗ −0.70% −2.32∗∗ 31.7% −2.13∗∗
Eco-Friendly Products 62 0.05% 0.28 0.05% 0.68 51.6% 0.44
Renewable Energy 40 0.20% 0.79 0.16% 0.93 57.5% 1.25
Recycling 64 0.32% 1.06 0.05% 0.32 51.6% 0.54
Miscellaneous 139 0.05% 0.24 0.07% 0.17 52.5% 1.03
All tests are one-tailed: ∗p ≤ 0.10; ∗∗p ≤ 0.05; ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01
The lack of market reaction to CEI announcements is intriguing. It is plausible
that the market might partially anticipate announcements, based on certain charac-
teristics of the announcing firms. To explore this further, we examine three factors
that could cause the market to partially anticipate environmental announcements by
a firm, namely, the size of the firm, the frequency of environmental announcements
for the firm, and the environmental reputation of the firm.
Firm size has been found to be influential in several event studies (e.g., Hendricks
and Singhal 2003, Girotra, Terwiesch, and Ulrich 2007). Typically, smaller firms
have stronger market reactions than larger firms due to the greater relative impact
of any one event to the firm’s revenues or costs. Also, since smaller firms tend to be
less closely followed by analysts, their announcements may have more of a surprise
element when compared to announcements by larger firms. Thus, environmental
announcements would likely result in stronger market reactions for smaller firms. To
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test for the effect of firm size, we divide our sample into quartiles by total assets.
We then compare the market reactions for firms in the lowest quartile (total assets
less than $2 billion; median total assets are $647 million) with those for firms in the
highest quartile (total assets greater than $30 billion; median total assets are $60.8
billion).
Additionally, it is reasonable to assume that the “new information” content in
an announcement for a firm with relatively infrequent environmental performance
announcements would generally be greater than that for a firm with more frequent
environmental performance announcements. Thus, we expect that firms with a lower
announcement frequency would have stronger market reactions to their announce-
ments than firms with a higher frequency. We measure announcement frequency as
the number of announcements per firm during our three-year study period. We test
for the effect of announcement frequency by comparing the market reactions asso-
ciated with announcements for firms that have an average of less than or equal to
one announcement per year to those for firms with an average of more than one
announcement per year.
Market reaction could also depend upon the firm’s environmental reputation. The
announcement of an environmental initiative by a firm not known to be a strong
environmental performer will be more of a surprise to the market than that by a
firm with a superior environmental reputation. We capture a firm’s environmental
reputation as the indicator of whether the firm was included in the Dow Jones World
Sustainability Index (DJSI World) at the time of the announcement. Launched in
1999, the DJSI World uses weights for economic, environmental, and social criteria
to annually determine the top performers among the world’s 3,000 largest publicly
traded firms (Dow Jones 2008). To test for the effect of environmental reputation,
we compare the market reactions for the two announcement groups corresponding to
firms either listed or not listed in the DJSI World as of the announcement day.
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For each of the above three factors, we test for differences in means and medi-
ans between the respective announcement groups using t-tests and Mann-Whitney
Z-tests. In each case, the differences are in the theorized directions but insignif-
icant. For example, small firms have a mean (median) abnormal return of 0.04%
(0.09%) compared to 0.00% (−0.01%) for large firms. The mean (median) difference
in abnormal returns is 0.04% (0.10%) but is insignificantly different from zero. The
results suggest that the market does not react significantly to CEI announcements
as an entire category, despite controlling for firm size, announcement frequency, and
environmental reputation.
However, it is plausible that the market reaction could differ by CEI subcategory.
The market might react positively, negatively, or not at all to some subcategories. By
aggregating CEI announcements of different types, the average reaction could well be
insignificantly different from zero. We therefore provide descriptive results for each
of the seven CEI subcategories. Panel B of Table 3.4 presents these results for the
two-day event period (Days −1 and 0).
In the subcategory of environmental business strategies, the mean abnormal return
during the two-day event period is 0.72%, significant at the 1% level. However, the
median return of −0.01% is insignificantly different from zero. Only 49.1% of the
abnormal returns are positive, which is insignificantly higher than the percent positive
abnormal returns during the estimation period. Thus, the evidence suggests that the
market does not react to announcements in the environmental business strategies
subcategory.
The mean (median) abnormal return for environmental philanthropy is 0.45%
(0.43%), statistically significant at the 10% (10%) level. In addition, 64.5% of the
abnormal returns are positive, which is significantly higher (at the 5% level) than
the percent positive abnormal returns during the estimation period. This could be
because such philanthropic actions generate customer goodwill and enhance corporate
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reputation, thus contributing to future profitability growth. Our results are supported
by Wang, Choi, and Li (2008), who document that financial performance is increasing
in low-to-moderate levels of philanthropy.
Perhaps our most surprising result is for announcements of voluntary emission
reductions. The mean (median) abnormal return is −0.90% (−0.70%), statistically
significant at the 1% (5%) level. The 31.7% positive returns are also significantly
lower (at the 5% level) than the percent positive during the estimation period. Thus,
announcements of voluntary emission reductions are viewed negatively by the mar-
ket. This finding has some support in the literature. In addition to the theoretical
arguments of Friedman (1970) discussed earlier, Hart and Ahuja (1996) suggest that
while initial emission reductions may also improve financial performance, subsequent
reductions are more likely to result from costly pollution control. Fisher-Vanden and
Thorburn (2008) find that membership in the EPA Climate Leaders program yields a
negative abnormal return of −0.90%; the negative abnormal returns are even stronger
when specific pledges are made for GHG reductions. The Climate Leaders program
is referred to in 12 of the 41 announcements in our voluntary emissions reductions
subcategory; the remainder of the announcements within the subcategory relate to
other air emissions or hazardous waste reductions.
The market reactions for the remaining CEI subcategories – eco-friendly products,
renewable energy, recycling, and miscellaneous – are statistically insignificant.
3.5.1.1 Consideration of Multiple Inferences and Statistical Significance
Given that our analysis draws multiple inferences from the CEI announcement data,
we consider whether the statistical significance of each result is reduced. The ob-
jective of adjusting the statistical significance for multiple inferences is to reduce the
probability of false positives (i.e., Type I errors). Our first protection against spurious
conclusions is the use of both parametric and non-parametric statistical tests – t-test,
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Wilcoxon signed-rank test, and generalized sign test – for each result. We look for
consistency among the tests to ensure robustness.
As an alternative to consistency among multiple tests, numerous methods have
been devised to directly adjust statistical significance for multiple inferences. The
methods vary in both their power and their specificity. One such technique – the Sidak
method – is derived from the theorem that the joint probability of independent events
is the product of their individual probabilities. The adjusted p-value is determined
as:
p̂ = 1− (1− p)k
where k is the number of multiple inferences drawn from the data. In our analysis,
each CEI data point is used to infer two estimates: one for the overall CEI category,
and one for the specific CEI subcategory. Thus, k = 2. Table 3.5 presents the
CEI subcategory unadjusted and adjusted p-values for which we report significant
results, namely, environmental business strategies, environmental philanthropy, and
voluntary emission reductions.
Table 3.5: Unadjusted (Adjusted) p-values for selected Corporate Environmental
Initiative (CEI) Subcategories
Mean Median %
Subcategory Abnormal p (p̂) Abnormal p (p̂) Positive p (p̂)
Return Return
Env. Business Strategies 0.72% 0.003 (0.005) −0.01% 0.353 (0.582) 49.1% 0.442 (0.689)
Env. Philanthropy 0.45% 0.089 (0.170) 0.43% 0.059 (0.115) 64.5% 0.030 (0.059)
Vol. Emission Reductions −0.90% 0.003 (0.006) −0.70% 0.011 (0.021) 31.7% 0.017 (0.033)
Adjustments to p-values are made using the Sidak Method. All tests are one-tailed.
Comparing the results in Table 3.5 with those in Table 3.4, we see that the signifi-
cance levels remain unchanged for the environmental business strategies and voluntary
emission reductions subcategories. However, in the environmental philanthropy sub-
category, the significance level for the mean and median abnormal returns decreases
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from the 0.10 level to greater than 0.10, and the significance level of the % positive
abnormal returns decreases from the 0.05 level to 0.10. Thus, statistical support for
the environmental philanthropy subcategory is weakened.
3.5.2 EAC Announcements
Panel A of Table 3.6 presents the results for the full sample of 381 EAC announce-
ments. The mean abnormal return for Days −1, 0, and the two-day event period are
all negative (−0.09%, −0.03%, and −0.12%, respectively) but statistically insignifi-
cant. Similarly, the median abnormal returns are negative but statistically insignifi-
cant, and the percent positive abnormal returns are insignificantly different than the
percent positive abnormal returns during the estimation period. Results for the five-
day period preceding the announcements do not indicate significant market reaction
either. Thus, the evidence suggests that the market does not react significantly to
the entire category of EAC announcements.
Table 3.6: Event Period Abnormal Returns for the 381 Environmental Award and
Certification (EAC) Announcements
Panel A: Environmental Awards and Certifications (EACs)
Day −1 Day 0 Days −1 and 0
Mean Abnormal Return −0.09% −0.03% −0.12%
t-Statistic −0.62 −0.76 −0.98
Median Abnormal Return −0.03% −0.01% −0.10%
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Z-Statistic −0.08 −0.42 −0.36
% Abnormal Returns Positive 48.8% 49.6% 46.7%
Generalized Sign Test Z-Statistic 0.29 0.60 −0.53
Panel B: EAC Subcategory Results for Event Period (Days −1 and 0)
Mean t Median Wilcoxon % Generalized
Subcategory N Abnormal Statistic Abnormal Signed- Positive Sign
Return Return Rank Z Z
ISO 14001 Certifications 51 0.33% 0.78 0.65% 2.10∗∗ 58.8% 1.64∗
LEED Certifications 22 0.01% 0.58 0.34% 0.30 63.6% 1.48∗
Federal Awards 100 −0.12% −0.35 −0.09% −0.09 45.0% −0.57
State/Local Government Awards 65 −0.29% −0.72 −0.04% −1.00 47.7% −0.14
Non-Government Awards 143 −0.22% −1.51∗ −0.18% −1.10 40.6% −1.85∗∗
All tests are one-tailed: ∗p ≤ 0.10; ∗∗p ≤ 0.05; ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01
As with CEI announcements, we determine whether firm size, announcement
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frequency, and environmental reputation influence the market reaction to EAC an-
nouncements. For each of the three factors, we divide our sample of EAC announce-
ments into respective groups and test for differences in means (medians) using t-tests
(Mann-Whitney Z-tests). The resulting changes in market reactions are statistically
insignificant. As an example, small firms have a mean (median) abnormal return of
0.16% (0.10%) compared to the mean (median) abnormal return of 0.03% (−0.02%)
for large firms. The mean (median) difference in abnormal returns is 0.13% (0.12%)
but is insignificantly different from zero. The results indicate that the market does not
react significantly to EAC announcements as an entire category, despite controlling
for firm size, announcement frequency, and environmental reputation.
However, as with CEIs, it is plausible that the market may not perceive all sub-
categories of EACs to be value creating. We therefore provide descriptive results for
each of the five EAC subcategories. Panel B of Table 3.6 presents the results for the
two-day event period. There are several interesting results that we highlight.
First, the market reacts positively to announcements of ISO 14001 certifica-
tion. The mean (median) abnormal return during the two-day event period is 0.33%
(0.65%); the median abnormal return is statistically significant at the 5% level. 58.8%
of the abnormal returns are positive, significantly higher (at the 10% level) than the
percent positive during the estimation period. The literature offers some support for
the positive impact of ISO 14001 in particular and EMSs in general on firm perfor-
mance, using survey data (Delmas 2001, Melnyk et al. 2003). To our knowledge, we
are the first to provide empirical evidence of the impact of ISO 14001 certification on
the market value of the firm.
Second, although 63.6% of the abnormal returns for LEED certifications are pos-
itive and significantly higher (at the 10% level) than the percent positive during the
estimation period, the mean (median) abnormal return is 0.01% (0.34%) and is sta-
tistically insignificant. Thus, despite the benefits of LEED certification cited in the
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literature (e.g., von Paumgartten 2003, Corbett and Muthulingam 2007), the market
reaction is insignificant.
Third, average market reactions for awards granted by both federal and state/local
governments are statistically insignificant. Our findings are different from those re-
ported by Klassen and McLaughlin (1996). Using announcements during the period
1985-1991, they find a significant abnormal return of 0.82% for environmental awards
and no significant differences across award-giver types (whether national/international
or state/local). A possible explanation for our results is that the growing importance
of environmental management in general is such that the market may now expect the
level of performance required by awards; i.e., awards do not convey significant new
information to the market. The lack of market reaction to environmental awards may
also be due to the increasing frequency of such awards over time. As an example, the
US EPA/DOE Energy Star Program has grown from one award in 1993 to 92 awards
in 2007 (Energy Star 2008).
Interestingly, non-government awards result in a −0.22% mean abnormal return,
significant at the 10% level. 40.6% of the abnormal returns are positive, significantly
lower (at the 5% level) than the percent positive during the estimation period. Thus,
the market actually views the winning of non-government awards negatively. This
could be because the market may perceive the efforts in seeking such awards as
unnecessarily expensive relative to the value they provide.
3.5.2.1 Consideration of Multiple Inferences and Statistical Significance
As with CEIs, we consider whether the statistical significance of our EAC results are
reduced due to multiple inferences. Using the same procedure as with CEIs, Table 3.7
presents the EAC subcategory unadjusted and adjusted p-values for which we report
significant results, namely, ISO 14001 certifications, and non-government awards.
66
Table 3.7: Unadjusted (Adjusted) p-values for selected Environmental Awards and
Certifications (EAC) Subcategories
Mean Median %
Subcategory Abnormal p (p̂) Abnormal p (p̂) Positive p (p̂)
Return Return
ISO 14001 Certifications 0.33% 0.221 (0.393) 0.65% 0.018 (0.036) 58.8% 0.050 (0.098)
Non-Government Awards -0.22% 0.067 (0.129) -0.18% 0.136 (0.254) 40.6% 0.032 (0.063)
Adjustments to p-values are made using the Sidak Method. All tests are one-tailed.
Comparing the results in Table 3.7 with those in Table 3.6, we see that the signifi-
cance levels remain unchanged for the ISO 14001 certification subcategory. However,
in the non-government awards subcategory, the significance level for median abnor-
mal returns decreases from the 0.10 level to greater than 0.10, and the significance
level of the % positive abnormal returns decreases from the 0.05 level to 0.10. Thus,
statistical support for the non-government awards subcategory is weakened.
3.5.3 Self-Disclosed Information vs. Third-Party Assessments
To determine whether the market values self-disclosed information about environmen-
tal performance differently than third-party assessments, we test for the difference in
the overall market reactions to CEIs and EACs. Using a one-tailed test, we find that
the means (medians) are insignificantly different from each other (t-statistic is −1.44;
Mann-Whitney Z-statistic is −1.14). Thus, the market does not react differently to
the two categories. A possible explanation for this result is that our sample consists
of relatively large firms (median total assets are $15.1 billion), and recent studies
have shown that self-disclosed environmental information increasingly reflects actual
environmental performance particularly for large firms (Patten 2002, Al-Tuwaijri,
Christensen, and Hughes 2004).
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3.6 Summary
This paper analyzes the shareholder value effects of environmental performance by
measuring the market reaction associated with announcements of environmental per-
formance. We examine the market reaction to two categories of environmental perfor-
mance. The first category includes 430 announcements of Corporate Environmental
Initiatives (CEIs) that provide information about self-reported corporate efforts to
avoid, mitigate, or offset the environmental impacts of the firm’s products, services,
or processes. The second category includes 381 announcements of Environmental
Awards and Certifications (EACs) that provide information about recognition granted
by third parties specifically for environmental performance. Although we find that
the market does not react to announcements in the aggregate categories of CEIs and
EACs, we do find significant market reactions for certain announcement types. Specif-
ically, announcements of philanthropic gifts for environmental causes result in a statis-
tically significant mean (median) abnormal return of 0.45% (0.43%); announcements
of voluntary emission reductions result in a statistically significant mean (median)
abnormal return of −0.90% (−0.70%); and announcements of ISO 14001 certification
result in a statistically significant median abnormal return of 0.65%. In addition,
the difference between the overall market reactions to the CEI and EAC categories is
statistically insignificant.
The above findings translate into a number of insights. First, the market is se-
lective in reacting to environmental efforts. Second, when the market does react, it
does not do so uniformly; certain environmental efforts are even viewed negatively
by the market. Third, the market reaction to environmental awards is quite different
since the time of the work by Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) that found signifi-
cant and positive market reaction to environmental awards. A key implication for
managers seeking to improve market value through environmental efforts is to be se-
lective and not rush to implement the variety of environmental activities touted by
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various stakeholders. Additionally, since budgets for environmental efforts are typ-
ically limited, it is important that potentially value-improving efforts be identified
and pursued. Furthermore, a business case behind such efforts must be rationalized
and communicated.
Avenues for future research include studies of the long-term relationship between
environmental and market performance. While we observe that the market’s reac-
tion to awards is quite different than that reported in the literature a decade ago,
statistical evidence across time will inform managers as to the changing nature of
the market’s assessment of environmental efforts, and will also provide valuable input
for awarding and certifying agencies to tailor commendations to specific attributes
that create value. Another interesting direction is to use alternative measures of firm
performance. If CEI or EAC announcements truly affect shareholder value, measures
such as return on assets or return on sales would be impacted as well. A study fo-
cusing on the effects of environmental initiatives on accounting-based measures will
help in further understanding the link between environmental performance and firm
performance. A limitation of our study is that self-reported announcements of envi-
ronmental efforts do not imply that the corresponding environmental objectives will
indeed be realized. Although challenging, a treatment of the possibility of window
dressing or that of ineffectiveness of demonstrated efforts, will allow for interesting
additional insights into the continuing debate.
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CHAPTER IV
THE EFFECT OF PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT
RESTRUCTURING ON SHAREHOLDER VALUE
4.1 Introduction
Product development is a potential source of competitive advantage for many firms
and continues to be a subject of research and interest by academics and practition-
ers (see reviews by Brown and Eisenhardt 1995, and Shane and Ulrich 2004). To
improve product development effectiveness, firms have focused on improving their
product development process, rationalizing their product portfolios, and realigning
their organizational structure (Krishnan and Ulrich 2001). The literature has used
analytical and empirical methods to study many strategies for improving product de-
velopment such as component sharing, supplier integration, portfolio selection, testing
sequence, and team structure. These strategies are generally applied at a product or
platform level. At a firm level, many companies have restructured their product de-
velopment function, which often involves reorganization, realignment, refocusing, or
streamlining of the product development organization.
This paper examines the effect of product development restructuring (hereafter
referred to as PDR) on shareholder value. We research two issues. First, we use
the event study methodology to estimate the overall magnitude of the stock market
reaction to a sample of PDR announcements made by publicly traded firms. Second,
we examine how certain characteristics of the firm and the nature of the PDR influ-
ence the stock market reaction. In particular, we develop and test hypotheses that
relate the stock market reaction to the announcing firm’s prior financial performance,
primary restructuring objective, R&D expenditures, and size.
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The research presented in this paper is important for a number of reasons. First,
the product development literature has presented many strategies for improving the
effectiveness of product development. These include component sharing (Fisher et
al. 1999, Krishnan and Gupta 2001), integration with suppliers (Clark 1989, Takeishi
2001), portfolio balance and selection (Ali et al. 1993, Chao and Kavadias 2008),
organization and team structure (Zajac et al. 1991, Sosa et al. 2004), and others. The
study of these strategies is typically from an analytical perspective, and evidence of
their adoption, use, and impacts is often anecdotal. By empirically examining PDR,
we supplement this literature by studying several aspects of product development
including the types of restructuring actions taken, the objectives behind restructuring,
and the effect of PDR on shareholder value.
Second, our paper adds to the literature concerned with the impacts of the prod-
uct development process. Although this literature is extensive, research on how the
performance of the product development process affects financial performance is rel-
atively sparse (Brown and Eisenhardt 1995). Exceptions include Terwiesch et al.
(1998), who find that product development effectiveness is an important determinant
of profitability for dominant firms in the electronics industry, and Hertenstein et al.
(2005) who find that firms with high design effectiveness exhibit improved financial
performance. Chan et al. (1990) and Eberhart et al. (2004), among others, find that
increases in R&D expenditures, a subset of product development expenses, result in
improved financial performance. The negative financial impacts from a lack of prod-
uct development effectiveness have been demonstrated by Girotra et al. (2007) in
their study of the stock market reactions to drug failures during late-stage testing,
and by Hendricks and Singhal (1997, 2008) who find that product introduction delays
reduce both stock prices and return on assets (ROA). We augment this literature by
examining the link between PDR and shareholder value.
Finally, we supplement the organizational restructuring literature. Bowman and
71
Singh (1993) categorize restructuring as three types: 1) financial restructuring; 2)
portfolio restructuring; and 3) organizational restructuring. Financial restructuring
involves changes in a firm’s capital structure by altering levels of debt, equity, and
other forms of claims. Portfolio restructuring comprises changes in a firm’s configura-
tion usually through acquisitions, divestitures, or spinoffs. Organizational restructur-
ing involves changes in a firm’s organizational structure. Such organizational changes
include the formation of new units, redefinition of intra-organizational boundaries,
realignment of management responsibilities, and adjustments in unit size or scope.
As discussed in Bowman et al. (1999), the literature on financial restructuring and
portfolio restructuring is extensive, but studies on organizational restructuring are
less common and have found mixed results. They suggest that, relative to the effects
of financial and portfolio restructuring, the impacts of organizational restructuring
are more contingent on the circumstances that initiate the restructuring. We augment
the organizational restructuring literature in three ways. First, we present empirical
evidence regarding varied types of restructuring including reorganizations, changes in
decision structure, establishment of new units, consolidations, layoffs, and reductions
in scope. Second, we examine how the characteristics of the initiating firm and the
objective of the restructuring moderate the stock market reaction. Third, we study
organizational restructuring in the specific context of product development.
Our results are based on an analysis of 114 PDR announcements during the period
2001-2007. We find that PDR announcements are associated with an economically
and statistically significant stock market reaction. Over a two-day period (the day of
the announcement and the day before the announcement), the mean (median) stock
market reaction is 1.60% (0.72%). The percentage of firms that experience a positive
market reaction is 58.8%. The stock market reacts more positively to PDR by firms
that financially underperform their industry group than to PDR by outperformers.
The firm’s primary PDR objective is not a significant determinant of the stock market
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reaction. However, the interaction between the firm’s prior financial performance and
its PDR objective is significant. PDR by financial underperformers is more positively
valued if the primary objective of the PDR is to cut costs. We also find that the
market reaction to PDR is positively correlated with the firm’s R&D intensity, and
negatively correlated with firm size.
The next section develops our hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes the sample col-
lection. Section 4.4 presents a discussion of the event study methodology used to
estimate the stock market reaction. Section 4.5 presents the results. Section 4.6
summarizes the paper.
4.2 Hypotheses
Firms undertake PDR to improve the effectiveness of their product development activ-
ity. The improved product development effectiveness from restructuring can increase
revenues and reduce costs. Revenues can be increased by better producing the right
products at the right time, which can lead to improved market share and higher
prices. Restructuring can reduce costs by boosting the efficiency and productivity of
the product development activity. Restructuring can also help to avoid the frequency
of product delays and failures, which can lead to improved profitability. To illustrate
some of the mechanisms by which PDR can improve shareholder value, we offer three
examples of PDR that differ in their actions and objectives, and examine how those
actions and objectives can lead to increased revenues or reduced costs.
In our first example, Cordis, a medical device maker and subsidiary of John-
son & Johnson, created the new post of Chief Technology Officer in 2006 to lead
the company’s technology development efforts. Through this restructuring, Cordis
sought to improve the decision structure, strengthen management support for prod-
uct development, and thereby increase the potential for development of breakthrough
technologies (Kamp 2006). If successful, the results would be improved products
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(with the potential for increased market share and premium pricing) and, therefore,
increased revenues for the firm. The organizational attributes that are targeted by the
Cordis restructuring, decision structure and management support, can improve prod-
uct development effectiveness (Brown and Eisenhardt 1995). Rothwell et al. (1974)
find that the appointment of an executive champion is associated with successful
products. Zirger and Maidique (1990), Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1994), and Swink
(2000), among others, find that management support is key to product development
success.
Our second PDR example is an announcement by Guilford Pharmaceuticals in
2002 that it would reduce its workforce of 280 by 20-25% in order to reduce expenses
and focus its resources on its most advanced product development programs (PR
Newswire 2002). Not only will the reduction in labor costs increase profitability and
shareholder value, but the increase in organizational focus can also create value. By
improving focus, managers can avoid the excessive complexity due to broad product
mix, catering to different market segments, and the need to develop different tech-
nologies (Skinner 1974, 1996). In the case of product development, increased focus
can lead to reduced proliferation in development projects, better allocation of lim-
ited resources to the remaining projects, and improved productivity of the product
development process (Wheelwright and Clark 1992). The value of corporate focus
has been examined in the literature. Comment and Jarrell (1995) find a significantly
positive relationship between increases in corporate focus and financial performance.
John and Ofek (1995), Daley et al. (1997), and Desai and Jain (1999) find that sale
or spinoff of unrelated assets results in greater shareholder value creation than that
of related assets.
Our final PDR example is the restructuring by Hewlett-Packard of its develop-
ment laboratories in 2007. In this case, Hewlett-Packard reduced the number of
projects and increased the resources on each remaining project to ensure each project
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had adequate resources to commercialize them and to also shift more resources to
innovative technologies (Mullins 2007). Wheelwright and Clark (1992) advocate such
strategies as a way to improve product development focus and achieve the benefits
of focus discussed above. Furthermore, firms need to strike the appropriate balance
of projects in product development portfolios subject to resource constraints (Shane
and Ulrich 2004). If firms are too biased toward their existing markets, they may
fail to recognize shifts in markets or technologies (Christensen and Bower 1996). By
devoting the appropriate resources to either incremental or radical innovation, firms
can optimize their product success, revenues, and profits (Chao and Kavadias 2008).
PDR can also create value by better aligning product development with corpo-
rate strategy and capabilities (Leonard-Barton 1992), fostering cross-functionality in
product development (Pinto et al. 1993, Keller 2001), and improving the fit between
organizational structure and product architecture (Sosa et al. 2004).
Based on the above discussion, we expect that PDR will have a positive effect on
a firm’s stock price. Our first hypothesis, stated in alternate form, is:
Hypothesis 4.1 PDR announcements will have a positive stock market reaction.
Our next hypothesis concerns how the market reaction to PDR is influenced by
the firm’s prior financial performance. There are at least three reasons why we ex-
pect prior financial performance influences the market reaction, namely, the relative
benefits from restructuring, investor expectations, and the motivation required to
successfully implement restructuring. First, the relative benefits of PDR for good
and poor financial performers can be considered in light of competing hypotheses
that are presented by Iqbal and Shetty (1995). The “potential benefit” hypothesis
proposes that since poor performing firms have more to gain from improvement ef-
forts than good performers, such efforts will be valued more positively by the market
than those by good performers. Conversely, the “financial distress” hypothesis posits
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that restructuring by poor performers might be seen as further confirmation of finan-
cial difficulties and indicative of continued poor business prospects, and so leads to
negative market reaction. The empirical evidence in support of these two hypotheses
is mixed. For example: Iqbal and Shetty (1995) find that layoffs by financially weak
firms are more positively valued than those by financially healthy firms; Khurana and
Lippincott (2000) find that the market reaction to restructuring in “loss” firms is more
positively valued than that in “profit” firms; and Brickley and VanDrunen (1990) find
that internal reorganizations are generally valued positively even though most firms
undertaking restructuring for cost/efficiency reasons experienced poor prior financial
performance. On the other hand, Blackwell et al. (1990) find that the market reac-
tion to plant closings is more negative for poor performing firms, and Worrell et al.
(1991) find that layoffs in financially distressed firms are valued more negatively.
Second, since restructuring is a strategy to improve the financial performance
of the firm, it is reasonable to assume that investors at least partially expect such
announcements from firms with poor prior financial performance. Thus, we would
expect that when PDR by a poor financial performer is announced, it will be inter-
preted as confirmation of investors’ expectations and will be positively valued by the
market. On the other hand, investors are less likely to expect PDR announcements by
good financial performers. Such announcements might signal either that the firm is
taking proactive efforts to improve performance, or that it is likely to face unknown
future problems or poor future business prospects. Since PDR announcements by
good performers are less expected by investors and the motivations behind them are
more uncertain, market reaction to them can be mixed.
Third, the firm’s financial performance can impact the motivation required to
successfully implement restructuring. The challenges in implementing organizational
changes such as restructuring are well documented in the literature (e.g., see survey
by Armenakis and Bedeian 1999). Bowman and Singh (1993) argue that although
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restructuring is intended to enhance performance, the changes it induces can be dis-
ruptive to operations, employees, and corporate relationships, can cause loss of com-
petencies, and might actually make the situation worse. Kotter (1995) suggests that
poor business results can increase the probability of successful restructuring because
the need for change is more apparent, and consequently the urgency and motivation
required for successful restructuring implementations is more readily found in poor
performers. Although financial distress can generate the required motivation and ur-
gency to restructure, it also limits the resources that may be needed to restructure.
From this perspective, financially healthy firms may fare better in implementing re-
structuring since they are more likely to have adequate implementation resources.
The above discussion indicates that although we expect prior financial perfor-
mance to influence the market reaction to PDR, the direction of the reaction is unclear
given the competing theories and empirical evidence. Our hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 4.2 The market reaction to PDR is dependent on the announcing firm’s
prior financial performance.
Next, we consider the influence of PDR objectives on the market reaction to
PDR. PDR objectives are varied and include goals such as increasing focus, reducing
time-to-market, addressing product development failures, exploiting new market op-
portunities, and boosting productivity. As we discussed in the development of H4.1,
achieving these objectives helps to increase revenues, reduce costs, or both. We ex-
pect that the market reaction to PDR is influenced by whether the PDR objective is
aimed primarily at increasing revenues or cutting costs. Ertimur et al. (2003) find
that the market generally reacts more favorably to unanticipated revenue increases
than it does to unanticipated cost reductions. They attribute this mainly to the more
persistent nature of revenue increases versus the more transitory nature of many cost
reductions; i.e., sales increases tend to be longer-lasting while cost savings are often
one-time events.
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Empirical evidence indicates that the market reaction to restructuring aimed at
cost cutting is less than that to restructuring intended to increase revenues. For
example, Brickley and VanDrunen (1990) divide their sample of internal reorganiza-
tions into “expansion” and “increase efficiency/cut costs” categories, and find that
the market reacts positively to both categories but that reorganizations intended to
cut costs are less positively valued. Similarly, Chan et al. (1995) find that the market
reacts positively to business relocations motivated by expansions but that relocations
to achieve cost savings are positively valued only if they do not indicate a reduction
in capacity. Lin and Rozeff (1993) find that the stock market reacts negatively to
cost cutting events (layoffs, closings, and pay cuts).
Based on the above discussion, our hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 4.3 The market reacts more positively to PDR that is primarily intended
to increase revenues than to PDR primarily intended to cut costs.
We also examine how the market reaction to PDR is affected by the firm’s R&D
spending. It is reasonable to expect that firms with greater R&D expenditures are
more dependent on product development and are impacted to a greater degree by
PDR than firms with less R&D expenditures. Given our conjecture that the stock
market reacts positively to PDR, firms more dependent on product development will
experience a more positive market reaction to PDR. To normalize the R&D spending
measure for firm size, we use R&D intensity (R&D expenses divided by total sales)
as our indicator.
Our logic that PDR has greater effect in firms with high R&D intensity is par-
alleled by findings in the literature that increases in R&D spending have greater
impacts in firms with already-high levels of R&D spending. For example, Chan et al.
(1990) find that R&D spending increases result in more positive market reactions if
the firm has higher R&D intensity than the industry average. Similarly, Eberhart et
al. (2004) find that R&D spending increases result in positive market reactions and
78
abnormal profit margins, especially for high-tech firms.
Our hypothesis regarding the firm’s R&D expenditures is:
Hypothesis 4.4 The market reacts more positively to PDR by firms with higher
R&D intensity than to PDR by firms with lower R&D intensity.
Our final hypothesis is that the firm’s size will influence the market reaction to
PDR. There at least three reasons for this. First, the impact of any single event
on a small firm’s future financial performance is proportionately greater than that
for a large firm. The profitability of small firms is more closely tied to individual
products under development, products that will more likely be directly impacted by
any PDR announcement. Second, firm size can be a proxy for diversification; large
firms tend to be more diversified than small firms. Since product development is
typically organized by business segment, the impact of PDR in a more focused firm
is likely more positive than that of PDR in a more diversified firm. Third, smaller
firms tend to be less closely followed by analysts and investors; announcements by
smaller firms have more of a surprise element when compared to announcements by
larger firms. Given our hypothesis that PDR is positively valued by the market, our
hypothesis on firm size is:
Hypothesis 4.5 The market reacts more positively to PDR by small firms than to
PDR by large firms.
4.3 Sample and Data Description
To generate our sample, we identify a preliminary set of keywords to collect a small
set of PDR announcements from The Wall Street Journal. We read these announce-
ments to identify additional phrases and words that are commonly used in PDR
announcements. Through an iterative process of testing keywords for search results,
we develop the final list of keywords that we use in our search (see Table 4.1).
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Table 4.1: Keywords used in Search for Announcements
(application design* or application develop* or application discover* or application innovat* or
component design* or component develop* or component discover* or component innovat* or
content design* or content develop* or content discover* or content innovat* or design develop*
or development staff or drug design* or drug develop* or drug discover* or drug innovat* or
engineering design* or engineering develop* or engineering discover* or engineering innovat* or
engineering staff or labs or laboratory or laboratories or network design* or network develop* or
network discover* or network innovat* or NPD or pharmaceutical design or pharmaceutical
develop* or pharmaceutical discover* or pharmaceutical innovat* or process design* or process
develop* or process discover* or process innovat* or product design* or product develop* or
product discover* or product innovat* or PD or R&D or research* or software design* or
software develop* or software discover* or software innovat* or technology design* or
technology develop* or technology discover* or technology innovat* or vehicle design* or
vehicle develop* or vehicle discover* or vehicle innovate*)
Near10
(acqui* or add* or align* or bolster* or boost* or build* or collaborat* or construct* or creat* or
discover* or effort* or emphasi* or establish* or expan* or form* or grow* or improv* or increas*
or innovat* or invest* or launch* or pact* or open* or rais* or renew* or resource* or reviv* or
set* or spend* or alter* or chang* or clos* or concentrat* or contract* or consolidat* or cost* or
cut* or decreas* or downsiz* or focus* or layoff* or mov* or organiz* or overhaul* or outsourc*
or pare* or realign* or reduc* or refocus* or reform* or reorganiz* or restructur* or retrench* or
revamp* or review* or slash* or split* or streamlin* or structur* or subcontract* or trim*)
We search the headlines and lead paragraphs of announcements in the Dow Jones
News Service and The Wall Street Journal during the six-year period 2002-2007.
We download announcements that meet the search criteria in these two publications.
The announcements are then sorted through multiple screens to obtain a suitable
sample. First, each announcement is scanned for relevance to PDR. Unavoidable
byproducts of such a broad-based search are announcements that have no relevance
to the desired topic (e.g., announcements about the expanding market share of the
Blackberry firm Research in Motion, announcements regarding investment research
policies, etc.). Second, we read the full text of each of the remaining announcements
and exclude duplicate announcements that appear in more than one publication. In
such cases, we retain the announcement with the earliest publication date. Third,
information from the remaining announcements is graded for its focus on PDR. We
retain only those announcements that are primarily concerned with restructuring of
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product development. Also, given that our research interests are internal restructur-
ing, we exclude announcements of development collaborations or joint ventures with
other firms.
Our final sample consists of 114 announcements. Table 4.2 presents descriptive
statistics of our sample; the information in the table is based on the most recent fiscal
year completed prior to the PDR announcement and is collected from the Compustat
Industrial Annual database. The mean (median) observation in the sample represents
a firm with $21.8B ($1.1B) in total assets, $14.1B ($574M) in sales, and 35,500 (2,600)
employees. Our sample includes firms from 16 unique two-digit and 31 unique three-
digit SIC codes. 46 announcements are from the pharmaceuticals industry (SIC code
283), and 15 announcements are from the software industry (SIC code 737).
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of 114 PDR Announcements; Sample
Statistics are Based on the Most Recent Fiscal Year Completed Before the Date of
the Announcement using data obtained from Compustat
Market Value Total Assets Sales Net Income Employees Debt-Equity EPS
($M) ($M) ($M) ($M) (000s) Ratio ($)
Mean 27,219.5 21,808.5 14,080.4 232.6 35.5 0.363 −0.11
Median 1,350.4 1,072.6 573.9 −4.2 2.6 0.058 −0.02
Std Dev 55,479.7 54,609.6 31,109.5 9,940.4 66.6 1.241 1.93
Max 266,036.4 323,969.0 173,353.0 19,337.0 365.0 9.858 5.06
Min 7.5 9.8 0.0 −98, 696.0 0.0 0.000 −10.01
PDR encompasses a variety of actions, including establishment of new units, merg-
ing or splitting of units, changes in decision structures, consolidations, layoffs, clo-
sures, etc. Many PDR announcements in our sample indicate multiple actions. Table
4.3 presents the distribution of restructuring actions that we find in our sample. We
classify each announcement by its “primary action” (the action either mentioned
first in the headline or lead paragraph or most frequently in the announcement) but
we also capture other actions discussed in the announcement (labeled in Table 4.3 as
“secondary action”). For the 114 announcements in our sample, nine different actions
are captured as either primary or secondary content or both. The most frequent PDR
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Table 4.3: Distribution of PDR Actions in the Sample of 114 PDR Announcements




Reduce Scope 14 15
Merge or Split Units 10 1
Establish New Units 10 0




action is Layoff. Layoffs are the primary action in 28 announcements (25% of the sam-
ple) and are the secondary action in an additional 28 announcements. Consolidate
and Divest are the primary actions in 15 announcements each, and Reduce Scope is
featured in 14 announcements. Together, these four primary actions comprise 63.2%
of our sample.
Some examples of the announcements in our sample include:
• “Boston Scientific Announces Plan to Reallocate CRM Research and Devel-
opment Resources”, Dow Jones Newswires, 8 January 2007. Boston Scientific
cuts 500 to 600 jobs, mainly from its cardiac-rhythm-management R&D unit
in Minnesota. By downsizing, Boston Scientific’s objective is to reduce costs
and focus more on a select number of development projects that better meet
customer needs. The primary action in this announcement is Layoff.
• “Sony President Narrows R&D to Focus on Promising Areas”, The Wall Street
Journal, 24 June 2005. Sony Corp. halts its R&D efforts in certain sectors to
concentrate its resources on those areas with the most promising commercial ap-
plications, including video equipment, mobile phones, and flat-panel televisions.
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The primary action in this announcement is Reduce Scope.
• “Flextronics International Ltd: Three Indian Software Firms to be Consolidated
into Unit”, The Wall Street Journal, 13 December 2004. Flextronics combines
three software development subsidiaries – Hughes Software, FutureSoft, and
DeccaNet Designs – into a single entity. Flextronics’ objective is to increase
internal product design and engineering capabilities. The primary action in
this announcement is Merge or Split Units.
• “DuPont Co.: Maxygen Plant-Sciences Unit to be Bought for $64M”, The Wall
Street Journal, 4 June 2004. Maxygen sells its wholly owned Verdia, Inc. sub-
sidiary to DuPont. Through this divestiture, Maxygen’s objective is to increase
focus on its human therapeutics business. The primary action in this announce-
ment is Divest.
4.4 Methodology
We use event study methodology to estimate the market reaction to the announce-
ments of PDR. This methodology offers a rigorous approach to estimate “abnormal”
returns associated with specific events by controlling for market-wide influences on
stock prices (see Brown and Warner 1980, 1985, and MacKinlay 1997 for a review of
this methodology). The abnormal returns provide an estimate of the percent change
in stock price associated with an event. The underpinning of event study method-
ology is that, in an efficient market, the wealth impact of an event will be reflected
immediately in the stock price.
The first step in executing an event study is determining the event period – the
period over which to estimate abnormal returns. Consistent with the approach used in
many event studies (MacKinlay 1997), we use a two-day event period consisting of the
day of the announcement and the preceding trading day to include the possibility that
the stock market acquired information before the actual announcement. To translate
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calendar days into event days, we designate the day of the announcement as Day 0.
If the announcement is made on either a non-trading day or after 4:00pm Eastern
Time on a trading day, the subsequent trading day is treated as Day 0. All other
days in the study are measured relative to Day 0. Thus, the trading day immediately
preceding the announcement day is Day −1, while that immediately following the
announcement day is Day 1.
Although several competing models have been proposed to estimate abnormal re-
turns, Brown and Warner (1985) show that estimates of the magnitude and statistical
significance of abnormal returns are relatively insensitive to the model used. Con-
sistent with most event studies, we use the “market model” to estimate abnormal
returns.1 This model posits a linear relationship between the return on a stock and
the market return (i.e., the return on the market portfolio) over a given time period
as:
Rit = αi + βiRmt + εit (4.1)
where Rit is the return of stock i on Day t, Rmt is the market return on Day t, αi is
the intercept of the relationship for stock i, βi is the slope of the relationship for stock
i with respect to the market return, and εit is the error term for stock i on Day t.
The term βiRmt is the portion of stock i’s return attributable to market movements.
The error term εit is the portion of the return that cannot be explained by market
movements and therefore captures the effect of firm-specific information. To compute




of the error term εit) using ordinary least squares regression (see equation (4.1)) over
the estimation period of 200 trading days. We begin the estimation period from Day
−210 and end it on Day −11. We end the estimation period two weeks (10 trading
days) prior to the event day in order to shield the estimates from the effects of the
1All analyses were also conducted using the “market-adjusted model” and “mean-adjusted
model”; the results were not appreciably different and are not reported here.
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announcement and to ensure that any non-stationarities in the estimates are not an
issue. In estimating the parameters we require that a firm must have a minimum of
40 stock returns during the estimation period of 200 trading days.
The abnormal return Ait for firm i on Day t is computed as the difference between
the actual return of firm i and its expected return:
Ait = Rit − (α̂i + β̂iRmt)







where N is the number of announcements in the sample. To test the statistical
significance of the mean abnormal return in equation (4.2), each abnormal return Ait
is divided by its estimated standard deviation Ŝεi to yield a standardized abnormal
return. Since the abnormal returns are assumed to be independent across firms, we
know from the central limit theorem that the sum of the N standardized abnormal
returns is approximately normal with mean 0 and variance N . Thus, the test statistic






We use a t-test to determine the statistical significance of the mean abnormal return.





The test statistic TSe for a period spanning multiple days is derived in a manner













To check for the influence of outliers, we supplement the t-tests with two non-
parametric tests. We test for the statistical significance of the median abnormal
return using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. We use the binomial sign test to de-
termine if the percent positive of the abnormal returns during the event period is
significantly higher than the null of 50%. The percent of positive abnormal returns
during the event period is compared to the null and a Z-statistic is generated using
the normal approximation to the binomial distribution. Unless otherwise noted, we
report one-tailed p-values for all three tests since we hypothesize that abnormal re-
turns for PDR are positive. We look for consistencies among the three tests to ensure
the robustness of our results.
4.5 Results
For the full sample of 114 PDR announcements, Panel A of Table 4.4 presents the
market reaction for the day preceding the announcement (Day −1), the day of the
announcement (Day 0), and the two-day event period (Days −1 and 0). The mean
abnormal returns for Days −1, 0, and the two-day event period are all positive (0.73%,
0.87%, and 1.60%, respectively) and significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
The median abnormal returns for Days −1, 0, and the two-day event period are also
positive (0.57%, 0.01%, and 0.72%, respectively) with the returns for Day −1 and
the two-day event period significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Similarly,
the percent positive abnormal returns for Days −1, 0, and the two-day event period
are 60.53%, 50.88%, and 58.77%, respectively, but only the percent positive returns
for Day −1 and the two-day event period are significantly different from 50% at the
5% level. To test if our results are driven by outliers, we trim our data at 2.5% in
each tail. Panel B of Table 4.4 presents the results using the trimmed sample. These
results are consistent with those for the full sample. Overall, the results indicate that
the stock market reacts positively to PDR. Given the consistency of results for both
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the full and trimmed samples, we report results using only the full sample for our
remaining analyses (except where noted). 2
Table 4.4: Event Period Abnormal Returns for the PDR Announcements
Panel A: Full Sample (N = 114)
Day −1 Day 0 Days −1 and 0
Mean Abnormal Return 0.73% 0.87% 1.60%
t-Statistic 2.94∗∗∗ 3.19∗∗∗ 4.33∗∗∗
Median Abnormal Return 0.57% 0.01% 0.72%
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Z-Statistic 1.92∗∗ 0.20 1.85∗∗
% Abnormal Returns Positive 60.53% 50.88% 58.77%
Binomial Sign Test Z-Statistic 2.25∗∗ 0.19 1.87∗∗
Panel B: Trimmed Sample (N = 109)
Day −1 Day 0 Days −1 and 0
Mean Abnormal Return 0.56% 0.31% 0.87%
t-Statistic 2.81∗∗∗ 1.69∗∗ 3.18∗∗∗
Median Abnormal Return 0.58% 0.01% 0.71%
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Z-Statistic 2.15∗∗ 0.04 1.80∗∗
% Abnormal Returns Positive 61.47% 50.46% 58.72%
Binomial Sign Test Z-Statistic 2.39∗∗ 0.10 1.82∗∗
All tests are one-tailed: ∗p ≤ 0.10; ∗∗p ≤ 0.05; ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01
To put our results in perspective with previous findings in the literature, we con-
sider the study of internal reorganizations by Brickley and VanDrunen (1990). They
find an overall two-day abnormal return of 0.32% due to internal reorganizations,
compared to our finding of 1.60%. They attribute the small magnitude of their result
to the fact that the reorganizations they consider are limited to the unit- rather than
the firm-level, and so have a reduced impact on firm performance. In comparison, our
finding is for a functional area, product development, rather than a unit or subsidiary.
Other studies in the literature tend to focus on only one specific restructuring action
and generally find negative market reactions. For example, Blackwell et al. (1990)
find a −0.55% market reaction to plant closings, and Worrell et al. (1991) find a
−0.41% market reaction to layoffs.
2The results using the trimmed sample with 109 observations are not substantively different from
those obtained using the full sample.
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To investigate the effect of the firm’s prior financial performance on the market
reaction to PDR, we compute the firm’s prior financial performance as its return on
equity (ROE) relative to the average of its industry medians in Year −1 and Year −2
prior to the PDR announcement, where the firm’s industry is defined as firms with
the same three-digit SIC code as the sample firm. We measure ROE as:
ROE = (Net Income− Preferred Dividends)/Common Equity
We consider “outperformers” (“underperformers”) as those firms whose average ROE
in Years −1 and −2 is higher (lower) than the average of their industry group. We
exclude seven firms that had negative equity in either Year −1 or Year −2. Thus,
our sample for prior financial performance is reduced to 107 announcements.
Panel A of Table 4.5 presents the results for the two-day event period. Our
sample is divided between 57 outperformers and 50 underperformers. Although the
mean abnormal return for the outperformers is 0.22% and is significantly different
from zero at the 5% level, the median abnormal return is 0.25% and is insignificant.
The underperformers have a mean abnormal return of 3.96%, significant at the 1%
level, and a median abnormal return of 1.78%, significant at the 5% level. The
difference in means (medians) between the outperformers and underperformers is
−3.74% (−1.53%) and is significant at the 5% (10%) level. The evidence indicates that
the market reaction to PDR is dependent on the firm’s prior financial performance,
and that PDR is more positively valued in underperformers than in outperformers.
Next, we investigate the impact of the firm’s primary PDR objective on market
reaction. Our sample is divided into 65 announcements primarily aimed at cutting
costs and 49 announcements primarily intended to increase revenues. Cost cutting
announcements are generally targeted at reducing labor, facilities, or other product
development expenses. Referring to Table 4.3, the cost cutting announcements are
those in the PDR action categories of Layoff, Consolidate, Reduce Scope, and Close.
In addition, some of the Other announcements are classified as cost cutting based
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Table 4.5: Two-Day Event Period Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Sample
of 114 PDR Announcements, conditioned on the Firm’s Prior Financial Performance
and PDR Objective
Panel A: Prior Financial Performance
Good a Poor a Difference b
N c 57 50
Mean Abnormal Return 0.22% 3.96% −3.74%
t-Statistic 1.79∗∗ 4.72∗∗∗ −2.04∗∗
Median Abnormal Return 0.25% 1.78% −1.53%
Z-Statistic d 0.71 2.21∗∗ −1.75∗
Panel B: PDR Objective a
Cut Costs Gain Revenues Difference
N 65 49
Mean Abnormal Return 2.01% 1.06% 0.95%
t-Statistic 4.69∗∗∗ 3.93∗∗∗ 0.58
Median Abnormal Return 0.71% 0.73% −0.02%
Z-Statistic d 1.16 1.58∗ −0.03
Panel C: Two-Way ANOVA of Prior Financial Performance and PDR Objective
SS df b MS F p
Prior Financial Performance 372.88 1 372.88 4.702 0.032
PDR Objective 88.35 1 88.35 1.114 0.294
Interaction 157.43 1 157.43 1.985 0.162
Error 8,167.76 103 79.30
Total 8,786.42 106
Panel D: Two-Way Rank ANOVA of Prior Financial Performance and PDR Objective
SS df b MS F p
Prior Financial Performance 2,985.6 1 2,985.6 3.213 0.076
PDR Objective 44.1 1 44.1 0.047 0.828
Interaction 3,350.7 1 3,350.7 3.606 0.060
Error 95,697.6 103 929.1
Total 102,078.0 106
a Tests are one-tailed: ∗p ≤ 0.10; ∗∗p ≤ 0.05; ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01
b Tests are two-tailed: ∗p ≤ 0.10; ∗∗p ≤ 0.05; ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01
c Sample size is reduced to 107 observations due to 7 firms with negative
equity in either Year −1 or Year −2.
d Z-statistics are obtained using Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests for individual
segments and a Mann-Whitney U test for differences between segments.
on announcement content. Revenue increasing announcements include asset sales,
entry into new markets, or efforts to improve performance in existing markets. Again
referring to Table 4.3, revenue generation announcements include the PDR action
categories of Divest, Merge or Split Units, Establish New Units, Change Decision
Structure, and the remaining portion of the Other announcements. Panel B of Table






































Figure 4.1: Interaction of the Firm’s Prior Financial Performance and PDR Ob-
jective on Mean, Median, and Ranked Two-Day Event Period Cumulative Abnormal
Returns for the Sample of 107 PDR Announcements
cutting PDR has a mean abnormal return of 2.01%, significant at the 1% level, and a
median abnormal return of 0.71%, insignificantly different from zero. PDR aimed at
revenue generation has a mean abnormal return of 1.06%, significantly different from
zero at the 1% level, and a median abnormal return of 0.73%, significant at the 10%
level. The differences in means and medians (0.95% and −0.02%, respectively) are
not directionally consistent and are insignificant. We can conclude that the market
reaction for PDR aimed at revenue generation is not greater than that for cost cutting
PDR. In fact, it appears that the market reaction is more positive when the PDR is
intended to cut costs.
The market reactions to PDR based on the firms’ prior financial performance
and its PDR objectives leads us to examine the interaction between the two factors.
Figure 4.1 presents plots of the mean, median, and ranked abnormal returns due
to PDR dependent on both the firm’s prior financial performance and its primary
PDR objective. The general pattern of the mean, median, and rank plots is consis-
tent and indicates an interaction. For PDR primarily intended to increase revenues,
the market reaction is positive but relatively insensitive to the firm’s prior financial
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performance. For underperformers, the mean (median) market reaction to revenue
increasing PDR is 1.46% (0.07%). For outperformers, the mean (median) reaction to
revenue increasing PDR is 0.71% (0.79%). However, for PDR intended to cut costs,
the market reaction is heavily moderated by the firm’s prior financial performance.
For underperforming firms, the mean (median) market reaction to cost cutting PDR
is 4.84% (2.72%). For outperforming firms, the mean (median) reaction to cost cut-
ting PDR is −0.46% (−0.22%). Panel C of Table 4.5 presents the results of a two-way
ANOVA of the mean abnormal returns that indicates the interaction effect is greater
than the PDR objective main effect but is insignificant. Panel D of Table 4.5 presents
the results of a two-way ANOVA on abnormal return ranks; it indicates that the in-
teraction effect is significant at the 10% level. The existence of the interaction at least
partially explains the contradictions we find when examining the main effects of the
two factors. If we only consider outperformers, the market reaction is as theorized
in H4.3; i.e., PDR aimed at revenue generation is more positively valued than PDR
intended to cut costs. However, when underperformers are considered, the market
reacts more positively to cost cutting.
Next, to determine whether the firm’s R&D expenditures influence the market
reaction to PDR, we segregate our sample into firms that have greater and lesser
R&D intensity than the sample median (18.4%). Panel A of Table 4.6 presents
the results by R&D intensity category for the two-day event period. The mean
(median) abnormal return for the high R&D intensity group is 3.58% (1.62%) and is
significantly different from zero at the 1% (5%) level. The mean (median) abnormal
return for the low R&D intensity group is −0.38% (0.25%) and is significant at the
10% level (insignificant). The differences in means and medians are 3.96% and 1.37%,
respectively, and both are significant at the 5% level. The results suggest that PDR
is more positively valued for firms with greater R&D expenses.
Last, we consider the effect of firm size on the market reaction to PDR. To test
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Table 4.6: Two-Day Event Period Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Sample of
114 PDR Announcements, conditioned on the Firm’s R&D Intensity and Size
Panel A: R&D Intensity a
High Low Difference
N 57 57
Mean Abnormal Return 3.68% −0.38% 3.96%
t-Statistic 4.62∗∗∗ 1.51∗ 2.25∗∗
Median Abnormal Return 1.62% 0.25% 1.37%
Z-Statistic b 2.00∗∗ 0.56 1.83∗∗
Panel B: Size a
Small Large Difference
N 57 57
Mean Abnormal Return 2.84% 0.36% 2.48%
t-Statistic 4.13∗∗∗ 1.99∗∗ 1.39∗
Median Abnormal Return 1.20% 0.71% 0.49%
Z-Statistic b 1.38∗ 1.50∗ 0.38
a All tests are one-tailed: ∗p ≤ 0.10; ∗∗p ≤ 0.05; ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01
b Z-statistics are obtained using Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests for individual
segments and a Mann-Whitney U test for differences between segments.
for the influence of firm size, we segregate our sample by total assets and test the
market reaction to PDR by firms with total assets less than or greater than the sample
median ($1.07B). Panel B of Table 4.6 presents the results by firm size category for
the two-day event period. The mean abnormal return for the small firms is 2.84%,
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. The median abnormal return of
1.20% is significant at the 10% level. PDR for large firms has a mean abnormal
return of 0.36%, significant at the 5% level, and a median abnormal return of 0.71%,
significant at the 10% level. The difference in means (medians) is 2.48% (0.49%) and
is significantly different from zero at the 10% level (insignificant). The results suggest
that the market reaction to PDR is more positive for small firms than it is for large
firms.
4.5.1 Multivariate Analysis
To further test our hypotheses, we develop two regression models to explain the two-
day market reaction. Model 1 includes our four hypothesized factors – the firm’s
prior financial performance (PFP ), PDR objective (OBJ), R&D intensity (RDI),
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and size (LTA) – as well as the interaction between prior financial performance and
PDR objective (PFP · OBJ) as independent variables, the market reaction for the
two-day event period as the dependent variable (ARi), and an error term (εi). PFP
is defined as in our earlier testing as the firm’s average ROE relative to its industry
group in Years −1 and −2. To capture the firm’s PDR objective, we define the
dummy variable OBJ with value 1 if the objective is revenue increasing, and value
0 if the objective is cost cutting. RDI is also calculated as in our earlier testing as
the firm’s R&D expenses divided by total sales in Year −1. LTA is defined as the
natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets in Year −1. Model 1 is shown in Equation
4.3:
ARi = β0 + β1PFP + β2OBJ + β3PFP ·OBJ + β4RDI + β5LTA + εi (4.3)
Since effective product development can be more critical in highly competitive
industries, we also test for its effect. As in Hendricks and Singhal (1997), we use the
Herfindahl index (HID) for the firm’s industry group as a proxy for the degree of
competition. Because the index is a measure of concentration, it is inversely related
to the competitiveness of the industry. We compute the industry Herfindahl index
by using the sales data of all firms in Compustat with the same three-digit SIC code
as that of the announcing firm. Model 2 is shown in Equation 4.4:
ARi = β0 + β1PFP + β2OBJ + β3PFP ·OBJ + β4RDI
+β5LTA + β6HID + εi (4.4)
Table 4.7 presents the parameter estimates (t-values in parentheses) for Models
1 and 2. Because of the sensitivity of regression to outlying values, we use the
trimmed sample of 109 announcements for our multivariate analysis. We exclude
five firms that had negative equity in either Year −1 or Year −2. Thus, the sample
size for our regression analyses is 104 observations. The F -values for Models 1 and
2 are 1.671 and 1.390, respectively. The signs of the coefficients for the hypothesized
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variables are as found in our earlier analyses; i.e., market reaction is greater for
financial underperformers, cost cutting PDR, high R&D intensity, and small firms.
If we compare Models 1 and 2, we see that the model fit is not improved by adding
our industry competitiveness control variable HID. In fact, the model significance
is decreased. Given the lack of significance for HID and the poorer model fit, we
conclude that industry competitiveness is not unduly influencing our results.
Table 4.7: Parameter Estimates (t-values) from Regression Results for Predicting
Two-Day Event Period Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Trimmed Sample of
109 PDR Announcements
Variable Predicted Model 1 a Model 2 a
Sign (Eq. 4.3) (Eq. 4.4)
Intercept β0 ? 0.5207 0.4782
(0.321) (0.292)
Prior Financial Performance PFP ? −0.9939 −1.0076
(−0.767) (−0.773)
PDR Objective OBJ + −0.3629 −0.3739
(−0.376) (−0.385)
PFP ·OBJ Interaction PFP ·OBJ ? 2.7183 2.7608
(1.108) (1.092)
R&D Intensity RDI + 0.1247 0.1253
(2.325)∗∗ (2.322)∗∗
Size LTA − −0.0086 −0.0158
(−0.043) (−0.077)
Industry Competitiveness HID ? 0.8958
(0.257)
N b 104 104
Model F -value 1.671 1.390
R2 7.86% 7.92%
Adjusted R2 3.15% 2.22%
a ∗p ≤ 0.10; ∗∗p ≤ 0.05; ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01
b We exclude five firms with negative equity in either Year −1 or Year −2 from our
trimmed sample of 109 announcements.
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4.5.2 Descriptive Results
The literature has typically examined restructuring by specific actions; therefore, we
include an analysis of PDR segmented by primary action for comparison purposes.
Table 4.8 presents descriptive statistics for each of the PDR actions in our sample
with more than 10 observations. The greatest market reaction is for Layoff (N =
28); the mean (median) abnormal return is 5.02% (1.34%), significant at the 1%
(10%) level. Also significant is Reduce Scope (N = 14) with a mean (median) market
reaction of 3.02% (3.79%), significant at the 5% (5%) level, and Divest (N = 15)
with a mean (median) market reaction of 1.92% (1.90%), significant at the 1% (5%)
level. Only Consolidate has a negative market reaction, although it is insignificantly
different from zero.
Table 4.8: Two-Day Event Period Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Sample of
114 PDR Announcements, categorized for all PDR Primary Actions with N > 10
Layoff Consolidate Divest Reduce Scope
N 28 15 15 14
Mean Abnormal Return 5.02% −1.46% 1.92% 3.02%
t-statistic 4.03∗∗∗ −0.53 2.68∗∗∗ 2.45∗∗
Median Abnormal Return 1.34% −0.94% 1.90% 3.79%
Z-statistic 1.47∗ −0.58 1.69∗∗ 1.65∗∗
All tests are one tailed: ∗p ≤ 0.10; ∗∗p ≤ 0.05; ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01
Given that the power of our descriptive analysis segmented by primary action is
low due to small sample sizes, and that category definitions are not always precise
or generally accepted in the literature, it is challenging to contrast our results with
previous empirical findings. Therefore, we only discuss comparisons for the Layoff
category; it has the largest number of observations in our sample (N = 28) and its
definition is commonly understood. Compared to the positive results in our sample
of PDR layoffs, Capelle-Blancard and Couderc (2007) find that abnormal returns for
layoffs are generally negative regardless of time period or geographic region. Their
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results are based on a review of 41 event studies of layoffs from 1970-2001. For
example, Iqbal and Shetty (1995) find a −0.3% two-day abnormal return associated
with layoff announcements, and Chen et al. (2001) find a −1.2% two-day abnormal
return. Caves and Krepps (1993) find that the average three-day abnormal return
for layoffs is −1.65%. As explained by Lin and Rozeff (1993), the negative market
reaction to layoffs is generally attributed to the decreased demand that is signaled by
such events.
4.6 Summary
Effectiveness of the firm’s product development function can be a key factor in build-
ing shareholder value. Managers often attempt to improve product development
effectiveness by restructuring but the subsequent impacts to shareholder value have
not been systematically studied. This paper analyzes the shareholder value effects
of product development restructuring (PDR) by measuring the market reaction as-
sociated with announcements of PDR. We examine the stock market reaction to our
overall sample of 114 PDR announcements. We also segment our sample to exam-
ine the effects of several factors on the market reaction to PDR. The factors tested
are the announcing firm’s prior financial performance, restructuring objective, R&D
expenditures, and size. We find that the market does significantly react to PDR
announcements with a mean (median) abnormal return of 1.60% (0.72%); 58.8% of
firms experience a positive market reaction. We also find that the market reacts more
positively to PDR by financial underperformers than it does to PDR by outperform-
ers. Regardless of whether the primary objective of the PDR is to cut costs or to
increase revenues, the market reaction to PDR is not significantly different. However,
for these two factors – the firm’s prior financial performance and its PDR objective
– we find a significant interaction. In addition, we find that the market reaction to
PDR by firms with higher R&D intensity is more positive than it is to PDR by firms
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with lower R&D intensity. Last, we find that PDR by small firms results in a more
positive market reaction than PDR by large firms.
From the above findings, we have a number of interesting insights. First, PDR,
on average, increases shareholder value. Given that product development accounts
for only a portion of the firm’s activity (the median R&D intensity in our sample is
18.4%), the fact that the average market reaction equals 1.60% is not only statistically
significant but also economically significant. In addition, our finding that the average
market reaction to PDR increases to 3.58% for firms more with greater R&D expenses
further confirms the value created by PDR.
Second, the greater positive market reaction for PDR by financial underperformers
adds evidence to the restructuring literature regarding the impact of the firm’s prior
financial performance on market reaction to restructuring. In particular, it lends
support to the potential benefit hypothesis of Iqbal and Shetty (1995); i.e., poor
performing firms have more to gain from restructuring than good performers. Perhaps
more importantly, our finding does not support the financial distress hypothesis of
Iqbal and Shetty (1995); i.e., PDR is not seen as indicative of poor business prospects.
We note that, even though the market reaction to PDR by underperformers is more
positive, PDR by financial outperformers is also valued positively by the market.
Given the other reasons we outlined in developing our hypothesis (H4.2), our finding
might also indicate that investor expectations about poor performing firms’ likelihood
to restructure is an important consideration, and that the firm’s financial difficulties
might help provide the necessary urgency and motivation to successfully restructure.
Third, contrary to our hypothesis (H4.3), we find that the market reaction to PDR
does not differ significantly dependent on the primary PDR objective (whether aimed
at cutting costs or increasing revenues). The market reaction indicates that PDR
creates shareholder value regardless of its stated objective. Although the firm’s PDR
objective has an insignificant main effect, it does significantly moderate the effect
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of the firm’s prior financial performance on market reaction to PDR. For financial
underperformers, PDR aimed at cost cutting is more positively valued than PDR
aimed at increasing revenues. Conversely, for financial outperformers, the market
reaction to PDR aimed at increasing revenues is more positive than it is for PDR
aimed at cost cutting. Logically, the three considerations influencing the impact of
the firm’s prior financial performance on the market reaction to PDR (outlined in our
development of H4.2) are all strengthened in favor of financial underperformers when
the PDR objective is cost cutting, and in favor of financial outperformers when the
PDR objective is revenue gains.
Finally, the market reaction to PDR is consistently positive regardless of the
segmentation criteria – prior financial performance, PDR objective, R&D expenses,
and size – that we use. These results are in contrast to much of the literature that
finds generally negative or mixed market reactions to organizational restructuring.
We conjecture that this disparity is due to the unique characteristics of product
development (e.g., its proprietary nature, uncertainty in results due to technological
and market challenges, consumption of significant firm resources) versus those of other
operational assets, and that investors consider PDR to be a signal of renewed focus
on this critical function.
Avenues for future work include a better understanding of the market reactions to
specific PDR actions and how they differ from the more general restructuring context.
For example, further work on the similarities and differences in the role of layoffs in
PDR versus layoffs in general is fruitful grounds for future research. By gathering data
on firms’ financial performance and product successes or failures subsequent to PDR
layoffs, we may be able to better tease out the relationships between PDR layoffs and
market reaction. Similarly, studying the relationship between product development
effectiveness and PDR is a topic worth further review. Do product development
effectiveness measures such as time-to-market, R&D productivity, and percent of sales
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from new products demonstrably improve after PDR? Another interesting avenue is
the use of alternative measures of firm performance rather than market reaction.
If PDR affects shareholder value, measures such as ROE, return on assets (ROA),
or return on sales (ROS) would also be impacted. A study focusing on the effects
of PDR on accounting-based measures will help in further understanding the link
between product development activity and firm performance.
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